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THE LOSS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY -THE
DEVELOPMENT OF STATUTORY EXPATRIATION
By JOHN P. ROCHE t
It is not generally recognized how recently the United States took
notice of nationality problems.1 Although it is not quite accurate to
say that prior to 1907 expatriation had no statutory foundation, there
was no general enactment governing either the substance or the proce-
dures of expatriation. There were naturalization treaties which au-
thorized loss of citizenship, but there were many nations with whom
these agreements had not been concluded. Furthermore, the treaties
were of two radically different types. Some, like the naturalization
convention of 1870 with Great Britain,' merely recognized naturaliza-
tion in a foreign state as effecting loss of American nationality. Others,
such as the Bancroft Treaties with the German states,3 not only au-
thorized loss by naturalization in the specified country, but also virtu-
ally prescribed it under certain circumstances. Beyond these treaties
loss of citizenship was legally unknown, and the denationalizing activi-
ties of the Department of State-although a practical necessity-were)
wholly without statutory warrant. The courts differed radically, for
example, on the result of marriage by an American woman to an alien
husband. Did such a marriage involve the wife's assuming the nation-
ality of her husband? Or did the common law rule of indefeasible
allegiance underwritten by the Supreme Court in an early case 
4 still
control ?
Until 1905 Congress refused to take any action on the problem,
despite repeated urging by the executives. However, the Fifty-Ninth
Congress, which was responsible for the passage of the NaturalizatioA
Act of 1906 providing, inter alid, for denaturalization, also took the
problem of expatriation under consideration. The House Committee
on Foreign Affairs requested Secretary of State Root to supply it with
all possible information on the subject. In line with this suggestion,
Root appointed the so-called "Citizenship Board of 1906". In Decem-
ber, 1906, Secretary Root submitted the Board's report 5 to the Speaker
t A.B., Hofstra; A.M., Ph.D., Cornell University. Assistant Professor of Political
Science, Haverford College.
1. For some discussion of this fact and the reasons for it see the author's EARLY
DEvFLOPI1NT OF UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP (1949) and his Pre-Statutory Denata-
ralization, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 120 (1949).
2. 16 STAT. 775 (1870).
3. 15 STAT. 615 (1868).
4. Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242 (1830).
5. See 3 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INT'L L. 164 (1942) (hereinafter cited HAcK-
VORTH).
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of the House of Representatives. Congress acted rapidly, and on
March 2, 1907, President Roosevelt approved the first general statute
providing for loss of American nationality.'
There was, it should be noted, one enactment in force in 1907
relating to the problem under discussion. The Act of March 3, 1865,'
provided for forfeiture of "rights of citizenship" by persons who de-
serted the United States armed forces. Although the meaning of the
term "rights of citizenship" was never clarified, the application of this
section will be included in this study.
Before commencing a detailed analysis of the operation of the
Expatriation Act of 1907 and its successors, one important question
must be answered. By what constitutional authority did Congress
pass this measure?
CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR DENATIONALIZING LEGISLATION
The Fourteenth Amendment states that "all persons born or natu-
ralized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States." Thus United States citizenship, after
many years of confusion, received specific constitutional definition. But
nowhere in that document is Congress given the right to deprive a per-
son of, or prescribe a mode of loss of, United States citizenship. On
what constitutional basis is the power to denationalize citizens ex-
ercised?
One justification was founded on Congress' power to establish a
uniform rule of naturalization. The early proponents of an expatria-
tion law argued that the inclusion in the Constitution of a specific au-
thorization to admit foreigners to the American community implied the
recognition of a right of other nations to do likewise. Therefore, the
power to admit persons to citizenship was concomitantly the power to
provide for loss of citizenship.8 However, this argument was dis-
credited in a dictum by Chief Justice Marshall. Insisting that the
naturalization power be narrowly construed, Marshall stated that "the
simple power of the national legislature is to prescribe a uniform rule
of naturalization and the exercise of this power exhausts it, so far as
respects the individual." ' Justice Gray, three-quarters of a century
later, amplified this by adding that "the power of naturalization, vested
in Congress by the Constitution, is a power to confer citizenship, not
a power to take it away." "o Although both these statements were
6. 34 STAT. 1228 (1907).
7. 13 STAT. 490 (1865).
8. See the author's Loss OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY 58 (unpublished thesis, Cor-
nell University, 1949).
9. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 827 (1824).
10. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 703 (1898).
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dicta, the scope of the naturalization power was severely limited by the
tradition they established. Bucking such a tradition is usually fruitless,
so the advocates of expatriation were forced to seek other constitutional
support for the legislation they desired.
The solution was found by grounding such legislation on an "in-
herent power of sovereignty" in the area of foreign relations. The
Supreme Court has always taken a generous view of governmental
actions based on this nebulous concept." Those desiring denational-
izing legislation maintained that the right to provide for loss of citi-
zenship was essential to the proper conduct of foreign relations, and,
as such, did not require explicit constitutional authorization. In 1915
the Supreme Court endorsed this application of the doctrine of inherent
powers of sovereignty, holding that
"As a government, the United States is invested with all the
attributes of sovereignty. As it has the character of nationality
it has the powers of nationality, especially those which concern its
relations and intercourse with other countries. ,, 12
Thus it was constitutional for Congress to pass statutes regulating
nationality, for without this power the United States would not be
fully sovereign. The tradition that expatriation must be voluntary was
so strong that the Court entered one qualification.
"It may be conceded that a change of citizenship cannot be
arbitrarily imposed, that is, imposed without the concurrence of the
citizen." "3
However, as the expatriation laws have been interpreted, it is not
necessary that there be a voluntary renunciation of American allegi-
ance; it is enough that one voluntarily perform an act that the statute
establishes as a criterion of voluntary expatriation.' 4
Assuming that the power to provide for loss of citizenship is an
inherent attribute of Congress, vital to maintaining the sovereignty
of the United States in the area of foreign relations-and to argue
otherwise would really be windmill tilting-we may now examine the
manner in which the various denationalizing provisions have operated.
11. For a discussion of the inherent rights of sovereignty see United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
12. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915).
13. Ibid.
14. See 3 HACKWORTH 209. This interpretation of "voluntary" is an absolute
essential to the administration of the statute. Without it, no general rules could be
applied. Conversation with Charles Gordon, Senior Counsel, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Washington, D.C., July 6, 1949.
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Loss By NATURALIZATION IN A FOREIGN STATE
The Expatriation Act of 1907 provided that an American who
became a naturalized citizen of a foreign state thereby lost his Ameri-
can citizenship. This provision was reenacted in the Nationality Act
of 1940, and has been in force continuously since 1907." ' The enforce-
ment of this section has been primarily in the hands of the Department
of State. The State Department has instructed every United States
foreign service officer to notify it whenever he ascertains that an Amer-
ican citizen has become lawfully naturalized in a foreign state.
16
The Department has ruled that involuntary naturalization does
not effect loss of United States citizenship.17 Some difficulty has
arisen in determining when naturalization in a foreign country is by
voluntary action. It was decided that one Doriani, who applied for
Soviet citizenship after being told that he "would be without the law"
during his stay in Russia if he did not become a Russian, retained his
American citizenship. Similarly, the Circuit Court of Appeals, Third
Circuit, recently held that a woman who became a naturalized citizen
of France to protect herself from the Nazis had become naturalized un-
der duress and did not thus lose her American citizenship.'" There
are many pleas of duress, but when this defense appears to be based
primarily on hindsight and is not made within a reasonable length of
time after the foreign naturalization the Department has ruled the
American citizenship lost.19
Certain countries have nationality laws which automatically be-
stow their citizenship upon persons who meet certain requirements.
This could be described as "constructive" naturalization, for the indi-
vidual is under no burden to apply, fill out forms, or take an oath of
allegiance."0 The operation of these statutes has presented the State
Department with a problem. How can it be ascertained whether the
individual accepts or rejects the citizenship thus thrust upon him?
15. 54 STAT, 1168 (1940), 8 U.S.C. §801 (1946).
16. CONSULAR REGULATIONS, cited 3 HACKWORTH 207; see also Carr to Philip,
Feb. 26, 1909, MS Dept. State, file #13607/117, cited id.
17. See Ass't Sec'y Carr to Clum, March 16, 1934, and other citations under same
heading, 3 HACKWORTH 209. For a humorous sidelight see id. at 208 for the case of
one who obtained Canadian citizenship while drunk and claimed his action to be in-
voluntary.
18. MS Dep't State, file 130 Dorianani, Waldemar, Id. at 210; Doreau v. Mar-
shall, 170 F.2d 721 (3dl Cir. 1948). For district court decision to the same effect
see Schioler v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ill. 1948).
19. See, e.g., MS Dep't State, file 130 Wuori, Bruno, 3 HACKWORTH 210.
20. E.g., id. at 211 (Irish Free State), 212 (Greece), 214 (Rumania), 213-14
(Italy). The Immigration and Naturalization Service has likewise held that the
promulgation of a blanket edict conferring citizenship on all persons living in a state
does not automatically expatriate Americans affected thereby. Such Americans must
indicate by a voluntary act that they accept the citizenship. Opinion, Legal Branch,
I. & N., Aug. 4, 1941, file #23/50490.
LOSS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY
For use in such cases the Department formulated what may be described
as the "doctrine of supplemental acts" which is exemplified by the fol-
lowing dispatch:
"No inflexible rule could properly be adopted by the Depart-
ment to determine when an individual has indicated his acceptance
of Italian nationality involuntarily conferred upon him by the
operation of . . . the Italian law of June 13, 1912..
the Department ordinarily considers that if an individual who
. . . applies for and obtains an identity card describing him as
having Italian nationality, [as authorized by Italian law] obtains
an Italian passport as an Italian subject, . . . joins the Italian
National Fascist Party, or performs any other act ordinarily open
only to Italian subjects, he should be considered as having thus
indicated his acceptance of Italian nationality .. *" 21
In similar circumstances it was decided that holding office as a mem-
ber of the Dail Eireann, Parliament of the Irish Free State, indicated
acceptance of Irish nationality.2" Each case had to be judged on its
merits, with the burden of proof resting on the individual who claimed
that he did not accept foreign citizenship.' It should be noted that
the Nationality Act of 1940 eliminated most problems of this character
by providing that voting in foreign elections; accepting office or em-
ployment with a foreign government for which only nationals of such
country are eligible; and serving in a foreign army, if such service be-
stows the citizenship of such country on the soldier, work loss of
American citizenship.
The Expatriation Act of 1907 included a proviso that "no Ameri-
can citizen shall be allowed to expatriate himself when this country is
at war." In view of this limitation, what was the status of those
Americans who were naturalized in foreign states between April 6,
1917, the date of United States entrance into World War I, and July
2, 1921, the official date of termination? In answer to this question,
Secretary of State Hughes advised that such expatriation would not
be recognized by the United States during the war, but it would be
"considered reasonable as a rule to recognize the foreign natural-
ization as effective in causing expatriation . . . after the ter-
mination of the war." 24
21. Dep't State to consul at Venice (1935), 3 HACxWORTH 214. See United States
ex rel De Cicco v. Longo, 46 F. Supp. 170 (D. Conn. 1942) in which the court held
that De Cicco's accepting duty in the Italian Army without objection was an affirma-
tive act showing that he accepted the Italian nationality which reinvested after two
years' service.
22. MS Dep't State, file 130 McCarten, Patrick, 3 HACKWORTH 211.
23. Acting Sec'y Carr to Ambassador Long (1934), id. at 213.
24. Sec'y Hughes to diplomatic and consular officers (1923), id. at 265.
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As a result of this interpretation, United States citizens who received
foreign citizenship during the war, did not lose their American citizen-
ship until July 2, 1921. Several courts,25 and Attorney General Jack-
son,2" later endorsed this view. The ban on wartime loss of citizenship
was discarded by the Nationality Act of 1940, so Americans were able,
throughout World War II, to give up their United States citizenship.27
The outstanding difficulty in the administration of the loss of
naturalization section was created by the status of American born chil-
dren of parents who, subsequent to the birth of the children, became
naturalized in foreign states. In most cases the naturalization of the
parents automatically naturalized the children. But was this "con-
structive" naturalization equivalent to voluntary expatriation on the
part of the child affected? Or did the child have dual nationality with
the right to elect American or foreign nationality at majority?
The State Department, prior to 1939, consistently maintained that
it would be inconsistent to permit the child to retain American na-
tionality. Even when the parents' foreign naturalization imposed for-
eign citizenship on the child without his consent, he still lost his Amer-
ican nationality.2" However, loss of United States citizenship under
these circumstances did not occur if the child remained a resident of the
United States "until after attaining the age of twenty-one years." 29
The Immigration and Naturalization Service, then part of the
Department of Labor, appeared to support the opposite interpretation:
that minors who were naturalized abroad through parental action were
entitled to elect American or foreign nationality on attaining majority.
However, in 1932 the Attorney General supported the Department of
State's interpretation.3" This view was subsequently buttressed by the
Ninth Circuit.8'
Until 1939 this view prevailed, but in that year the Supreme Court
reversed the State Department. Marie Elizabeth Elg, born in Brooklyn
of naturalized Swedish born parents, was taken as a small child to
Sweden by her parents. Subsequently, her parents reassumed Swedish
25. E.g., In re Varat, 1 F. Supp. 898 (E.D.N.Y. 1932) ; Petition of Prack, 60
F.2d 171 (W.D. Pa. 1932).
26. 39 Ors. Air'y GEN. 474 (1940).
27. This provision was repealed by § 504 of the Nationality Act, 54 STAT. 1172
(1940), 8 U.S.C. §904 (1946).
28. Sec'y Stimson to Kellogg, June 11, 1929, 3 HACKWoRTH 238.
29. Ass't Sec'y Carr to Att'y Gen. Mitchell, Oct. 7, 1931, id. at 237.
30. Citizenship of Tobiassen, 36 Ops. AiT'v GEN. 535 (1932). Congress realized
that this was the case, and occasionally passed special legislation such as the following:
"Be it enacted . . . That . . . James Lincoln Hartley, a native born citizen
of the United States who involuntarily lost his citizenship at the age of seven years by
reason of the naturalization of his father as a citizen of Canada, shall be held and con-
sidered to have been legally admitted to the United States . . [and may be
naturalized]." 50 STAT. 1030 (1937).
31. United States v. Reid, 73 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1934).
LOSS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY
nationality. Miss Elg returned to the United States when she was
twenty-one and established permanent residence. She was admitted as
a citizen, but shortly thereafter was informed by the Department of
Labor that she was an alien illegally in the United States and was
threatened with deportation. She instituted suit for the purpose of
clarifying her status. The Supreme Court upheld her claim: children
whose parents were naturalized abroad during the minority of such
children were dual nationals who were entitled to choose whichever
nationality they desired on attaining majority. Chief Justice Hughes
stated:
"Expatriation is the voluntary renunciation or abandonment
of nationality and allegiance. It has no application to the removal
from this country of a native citizen during minority. In such a
case the voluntary action which is the essence of the right is lack-
ing. 32
This decision, of course, forced a reversal in administrative
policy.3" However, a way was devised to compel all dual nationals in
the Elg class to commit themselves to one nationality or the other.
Under the Nationality Act of 1940, all persons of the Rig class who had
already reached majority were required to take permanent residence in
the United States before January 13, 1943 in order to maintain their
United States citizenship.s4 Those who were still minors must take
permanent residence in the United States before their twenty-third
birthday, or lose United States citizenship.
It should be noted that there was another limitation in this section.
Only those dual nationals who had not previously elected their other
nationality could take advantage of the saving provisions. This left
the determination of what previous acts constituted election of the
alternate citizenship in the hands of the administrators. Many cases
on this point have come before the Board of Immigration Appeals.
The Board has held that voting in Canadian elections, 5 or selling a
homestead which had been obtained during minority on the basis of
Canadian citizenship,3" constituted proof that the person concerned had
32. Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 334 (1939), affirminig 99 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir.
1938).
33. See Dep't State Circular, July 24, 1939, from Counselor Moore to all diplo-
matic and consular officers, 3 HACWORRTH 244-45.
34. 54 STAT. 1168-9 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 801a (1946). In accordance with § 601,
Nationality Act of 1940, 8 U.S.C. § 906 (1946), the provisions of the Nationality Code
did not take effect until 90 days after approval. The statute was approved October 14,
1940 and became operative January 13, 1941. Persons in the Eig class who had at-
tained majority prior to 1941 were able to establish permanent residence before Jan.
13, 1943 and thus save their United States citizenship.
35. In the Matter of W., 1 1. & N. Dzc. 24 (B.I.A. 1941).
36. In the Matter of C., 1 I. & N. DEc. 329 (B.I.A. 1942).
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elected Canadian citizenship. In other cases the Board has held that
previous admission to the United States as an American citizen con-
stituted election of American nationality, even though the duration of
the visit was as brief as one day." The Board has insisted, logically
enough, that a dual national need only make one election. For instance,
M , a dual national of Canada and the United States, established
residence in the United States when he was eighteen. Subsequently he
returned to Canada, aged twenty-two, and voted in Canadian elections.
Did his voting in Canada-at a time when voting in a foreign election
did not forfeit citizenship-indicate an election of Canadian nationality?
The Board said "No", for so to rule would have forced M to
make a second election. His moving to the United States at eighteen
was an election of United States citizenship which extinguished his
Canadian nationality. When he returned at twenty-two he was no
longer a dual national, and his subsequent actions were not relevant to
the question.8"
It should be noted that this provision applies only to dual nationals
of the Eig class-those who have obtained foreign nationality through
the naturalization of their parents. It does not cover dual nationals
by birth. A person born in the United States of alien German parents,
for example, did not have to make an election. Such persons have the
right to elect their other nationality, but are under no obligation to do
so. They may carry such dual nationality with them from birth to the
grave.
3 9
Loss BY SWEARING AN OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO A FOREIGN STATE
Section 2, of the Act of March 2, 1907, reenacted in the Nation-
ality Act of 1940 40 states that an American citizen may be expatriated
by taking "an oath of allegiance to any foreign state." But what con-
stitutes an "oath of allegiance"? The types of oath that can be sworn
vary from ironbound pledges of allegiance to vague and ambiguous
affirmations of fealty or obedience. How can an oath effecting loss of
American nationality be distinguished from one that does not?
37. See, e.g., In the Matter of S., file #56107/901 (B.I.A. Nov. 24, 1942) ; In the
Matter of Y., file #56158/623 (B.I.A. July 8, 1944). For a situation of this sort
which recently came into court see Petition of Di Iorio, 86 F. Supp. 479 (D. Mass,
1949).
38. In the Matter of M., 1 I. & N. DEC. 536 (B.I.A. 1943) ; see also In the Matter
of F., 1 I. & N. DEC. 502 (B.I.A. 1943) ; In the Matter of G., 1 I. & N. DEC. 496
(B.I.A. 1943) ; In the Matter of S., 1 I. & N. DEc. 685 (B.I.A. 1943). Mere residence
does not constitute adequate evidence of election. See In the Matter of S., 1 I. & N.
DEc. 476 (B.I.A. 1943). In this case the- Board held that long residence in Canada
did constitute election of Canadian nationality, but the Attorney General exercised
his power to review the Board's finding, and reversed this determination.
39. See In the Matter of R., 1 I. & N. Dmc. 389 (B.I.A. 1943).
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Generally speaking, the administrative authorities have attempted
to evaluate each oath on its merits. In the words of Secretary of State
Hughes,
"It is the spirit and meaning of the oath, not merely the letter,
which is to determine whether it results in expatriation. It is not
a mere matter of words. The test seems to be the question whether
the oath taken places the person taking it in complete subjection to
the state to which it is taken . . . so that it is impossible for
him to perform the obligations of citizenship to this country." 41
Furthermore, the oath must be one which is officially required by the
laws of the foreign state, and should be sworn before a "competent of-
ficial of the government concerned." ' Thus the administrative bodies
have decided that an oath taken before a notary public in Great
Britain,4 13 an oath sworn in pursuance of the regulations of a private
employer without authorization by the government,44 an oath taken by
a priest on ordination in the Church of England,45 or an oath sworn by
a lawyer to obtain admission to the German Bar 4' did not expatriate
an American citizen.
4 7
The problem of Americans who enlisted in foreign armies was one
which proved difficult to solve. Originally the Department of State
assessed each military oath and attempted to make a distinction between
those which expatriated and those which did not.48 However, in 1916
this difficult process was abandoned since the varying results
"seemed entirely unreasonable .... Aside from technicalities, the
practical effect of taking the oath in all cases seemed to be the
same." 49
40. 54 STAT. 1169 (1940), 8 U.S.C. §801b (1946).
41. Sec'y Hughes to Frank L. Polk, Mar. 17, 1924, 3 HACKVORTH 219.
42. Dep't State to Consul at Guadalajara, May 27, 1937, id. at 218.
43. Dep't of State to consular officer in charge at Birmingham, May 10, 1938, Ibid.
44. See In the Matter of L., 1 I. & N. DEc. 317 (B.I.A. 1942). L. swore an oath
to the Crown in pursuance of a regulation of the Canadian airline for which he worked.
This, the Board ruled, was not an "oath of allegiance" within the meaning of § 401b.
45. Director of Consular Service to Consul Glazebrooke, Oct. 30, 1914, 3 HAcK-
WORTH 223.
46. Dep't of State to Consul Gen'l in Berlin, Mar. 21, 1934, Ibid.
47. The oaths are examined to determine the degree of allegiance which they
imply. For example the following were not oaths of allegiance within the purview of
the statute: Oath for the Chinese Civil Service, Assistant Secretary of State Carr to
Minister Johnson, Mar. 6, 1930, ibid; oath for jurors in the British West Indies, Di-
rector of Consular Service to Consul McConnico, Dec. 11, 1915, ibid; oath for the
Indian Auxiliary Force, Director of Consular Service to Vice Consul Thorling, Apr.
5, 1921, ibid. The following oaths did effect loss of American Nationality: The Cana-
dian Civil Service, Director of Consular Service to Consul Reat, Aug. 3, 1915, id. at
22; The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Acting Secretary of Labor to Secretary
Stimson, Oct. 12, 1932, ibid; the Canadian teaching profession, Decision B.I.A., Sept.
7, 1944, file #56172/38.
48. Sec'y Hughes to Frank Polk, Mar. 17, 1924, id. at 224.
49. Ibid.
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Subsequently in the same year, a federal district court reached the same
conclusion, holding that no distinction existed between "permanent"
and "temporary" oaths of allegiance. In each case, the Court held, the
allegiance sworn was total, although the period of the allegiance might
vary. Any such oath effected loss of American citizenship. 50 This rule
appears to have been followed consistently since 1916, although some
exceptions may be found. The outstanding deviation, for which the
Board of Immigration Appeals was responsible, was the specious deci-
sion that Americans who entered the Canadian Army prior to United
States entrance into World War II, and swore an oath of "fealty"
specially fabricated to avoid loss of United States citizenship, were not
expatriated." As such Americans were merged in the totality of the
Canadian Army and were in all respects in the identical situation vis a
vis the Canadian government as their Canadian comrades in arms, this
decision is difficult to justify except as an extension of 'Lend-Lease"
into the field of manpower.
Under certain circumstances the taking of an oath of allegiance to
a foreign state did not effect expatriation. For example, an oath taken
while the United States was at war was of no effect. Furthermore, an
oath taken during the first World War did not automatically result in
loss of United States citizenship at the conclusion of hostilities-as
was the case, it will be recalled, with a foreign naturalization under-
taken in wartime. In this case, other factors had to be taken into
consideration. In the words of Attorney General Jackson:
". .. if such a person prior to the time the United States
ceased to be at war had returned to this country for permanent
residence and thereafter did nothing that indicated continued al-
legiance to the foreign state but, on the contrary, acted consistently
as a citizen of the United States, he did not lose his citizenship.
. . . The reason for . . . [the distinction] arises from the fact
that the nationality of the foreign state is not acquired through the
mere taking of an oath of allegiance .... ,, 52
In other words, if an American swore an oath of allegiance to a foreign
state between April 6, 1917 and July 2, 1921, he did not lose his United
States citizenship unless he demonstrated by some confirmatory act
that he had actually abandoned his allegiance to the United States.
50. Ex parte Griffin, 237 Fed. 445 (N.D.N.Y. 1916).
51. See In the Matter of T., 1 I. & N. Dac. 596 (B.I.A. 1943). In 1929 the
Ass't Sec'y of Labor held that an American who, on enlisting in the Japanese Army,
swore to observe the "Seven Duties of a Soldier" had not thereby lost his citizenship.
Opinion, July 15, 1929, file #4/2188.
52. 39 Ops. Ar'Y GEN. 481 (1940).
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This interpretation, promulgated by Secretary of State Hughes in
1923,f was subsequently ratified by two federal district courts. 4
The doctrine of "confirmatory acts" was also applied to Americans
who took such an oath of allegiance during minority." This rule that
minors could not expatriate themselves by swearing an oath of alle-
giance to a foreign state was adopted by the State Department after "a
rather unsettled policy". 0 At first the Solicitor of that Department
held that minors did lose citizenship by so swearing, that
"in the absence of a clear showing of duress, any person, whether
minor or adult, who takes an oath of allegiance to a foreign
State thereby becomes expatriated." 57
However, after several federal courts had decided that a minor could
not expatriate himself," the Department subsequently adopted the
doctrine of "confirmatory acts".5 9 The Board of Immigration Appeals
has defined a "confirmatory act" as an
"affirmative, overt act which indicates a continued allegiance to
the foreign state .... the overt act, in order to confirm the oath,
must have a direct relationship to the purpose for which the oath
was taken, thus amounting to a practical reaffirmation of the oath
of allegiance." 60
53. Sec'y Hughes to the diplomatic and consular officers, Nov. 24, 1923, 3 HACK-
WORTH 268.
54. In re Bishop, 26 F.2d 148 (W.D. Wash. 1927); In re Grant, 289 Fed. 814
(S.D. Cal. 1923). "A confirmatory act" was understood to be any action which demon-
strated that the oath taken to the foreign state was a final renunciation of U. S.
allegiance. E.g. MS Dep't State file #360c.117 Truty, Tadeusz, 3 HACKWORTH 268
(voting in foreign election). See In the Matter of C., file #56167/750 (B.I.A., Feb.
8, 1945) ; approved by the Attorney General, Oct. 2, 1946. The Board notes (footnote
1) that at the time of Attorney General Jackson's opinion, supra, "The Legal Advisor
of the State Department . . . urged that a person in this category [those who
took foreign oaths of allegiance while the United States was at war] became expatri-
ated unless he returned to the United States within a reasonable period after July 2,
1921, and it is significant that the Attorney General declined to accept this view."
Hackworth cites three cases in which the Department decided a person in this class
was expatriated by a confirmatory act, 3 HACKWORTH 269, and the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals noted that "An examination of the State Department files in two of these
cases (the third file was unavailable) shows that in both instances there was conduct,
in addition to residence, which could be regarded as confirming the oath of allegiance."
In the Matter of C., supra note 36.
55. In the Matter of L., B.I.A., Oct. 17, 1947, file #A-5998219.
56. In the Matter of C., mipra note 36.
57. MS Dep't State, file 130 Baglivo, Pietro, 3 HACKWORTH 274. This quotation
was taken from an amplification of the opinion of the Solicitor, Dec. 17, 1926, Ibid.
The original holding appears to have been made in an opinion by the Solicitor dated
Aug. 22, 1919, id. at 271.
58. See United States ex rel. Baglivo v. Day, 28 F.2d 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1928) ; In re
Zanetti, unreported, cited 3 HACxWORTH 274. This determination was supported by
dicta in Ex parte Gilroy, 257 Fed. 110, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) and later in McCampbell
v. McCampbell, 13 F. Supp. 847, 849 (W.D. Ky. 1936).
59. Opinion of the Solicitor of the State Dep't, Nov. 24, 1928, 3 HACKWORTH 274,
as modified by decision of Nov. 10, 1934, id. at 275.
60. In the Matter of C., mcpra note 54 (1945).
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Examples of acts which have been held to confirm an oath taken during
minority include: the swearing of another oath after attaining major-
ity,6 the performance of two reserves drills in the Czechoslovak
Army,62 voting in Irish elections,' and obtaining an Italian identity
card.
64
An oath of allegiance to a foreign state taken under duress does
not forfeit American citizenship,6" but the person claiming duress must
carry the burden of proof. 6 Furthermore, when a person has served
in a foreign army which requires an oath of allegiance of all soldiers,
he is presumed to have taken the required oath.67  A person who has
been judicially declared non compos mentis, a district court held, can-
not expatriate himself in this manner.6" In addition, the State Depart-
ment has decided, a parent's loss of American citizenship by taking an
oath of allegiance has no effect on the nationality of his children.6
Previously reference has been made to the fact that a person natu-
ralized in accordance with the laws of a foreign state while in the United
States does not lose his United States citizenship until he establishes
foreign residence. However, since few countries other than the Soviet
Union allow aliens to become nationals without establishing residence,
this limitation has not restricted loss of citizenship by foreign natural-
ization to any great extent. On the other hand, it has had a consider-
able effect on loss by taking an oath of allegiance, for many such oaths
are taken by persons while still residing in the United States.
Prior to 1940 there was no statutory justification for this rule.
The State Department merely decided, at some unidentified point in
history, that expatriation must be accompanied by removal from the
United States. The basis for this was the early interpretation of ex-
patriation as a tranfer of allegiance from one sovereign to another-
as opposed to simple loss of nationality. Such a transfer, according to
this line of reasoning, could not by definition take place within the
61. MS Dep't State, file 130 Sharp, David, 3 HACKWORTH 275.
62. MS Dep't State, file 130 Moravic, Joseph, ibid.
63. MS Dep't State, file 130, Montgomery, William, ibid.
64. MS Dep't State, file 130 Monte, Pasquale Del, ibid.
65. In the Matter of S., file #56175/295 (B.I.A. July 2, 1947) ; MS Dep't State
file 130 Music, Nikola, 3 HACKWORTH 226; United States ex rel. Fracassi v. Karnuth,
19 F. Supp. 581 (W.D.N.Y. 1937); In re Gogal, 75 F. Supp. 268 (W.D. Pa. 1947).
66. United States ex rel. Fracassi v. Karnuth, supra note 65.
67. United States ex rel. Rojak v. Marshall, 34 F.2d 219 (W.D. Pa. 1929).
68. McCampbell v. McCampbell, mtpra note 58. The court need not have decided
the case on this ground, for McCampbell swore the oath in 1903, prior to the passage
of the Act of 1907, and the Dep't had earlier held that an oath taken prior to 1907 did
not work loss of citizenship. Under-Sec'y Grew to Consul Gen'l Washington, Jan. 15,
1926, 3 HACKWORTH 218.
69. Dep't of State to consular officer in charge at Prague, Jan. 19, 1938, id. at 245.
This was prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in Perkins v. Elg, supra, and
was in line with that decision; see In the Matter of B., 1 I. & N. Dac. 429 (B.I.A.
1943) for a holding that a husband's oath has no effect on the citizenship of his wife.
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jurisdiction of the United States.7" The Supreme Court in Mackenzie
v. Hare 71 opened this argument to serious doubts by holding that the
marriage of an American woman to an alien resident in the United
States effected her expatriation. But the State Department managed,
by dint of some rather vigorous dictum citing, to distinguish the effect
of marriage in the United States from the effect of an oath taken'ir
the United States. The Department claimed that
"* . the [Supreme] court held in effect that the woman's citizen-
ship became . . . merged in that of her husband, regardless of
their residence. Thus the case was essentially different from that
of an individual who, while remaining in the United States, at-
tempts to subject himself to the sovereignty of a foreign state,
through the taking of an oath of allegiance." "2
In pursuance of this interpretation, the Department of State has held
that a person who swore an oath of allegiance to, or became naturalized
in, a foreign state while residing in the United States did not lose his
American nationality unless he left this country and established resi-
dence in such foreign country.
73
Congress apparently agreed that the State Department's addition
to the expatriation statute was wise and valid, for the Nationality Act
of 1940 provided that loss of citizenship as the result of naturalization
abroad or the swearing of an oath of allegiance to a foreign state, inteo
alia, would not take place until the citizen concerned left the United
States or any of its outlying possessions and established residence
abroad.74
In addition, the Nationality Act of 1940 eliminated the prohibition
on wartime expatriation, and included a proviso that no national under
eighteen years of age could lose his United States citizenship by swear-
ing an oath of allegiance to a foreign state.' Thus today an American
citizen loses his nationality by taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign
state unless the oath-was demonstrably taken uhder duress; or the per-
son taking the oath was mentally incompetent; or under eighteen years
of age; or residing within the United States or its outlying possessions.
An oath taken by a minor may be confirmed by a subsequent act of al-
legiance to the foreign state undertaken as an adult, and an oath taken
70. See MS Dep't State, file #136/740, Feb. 3, 1933, 3 HACKWORTH 229 et seq.
for a long and tendentious justification of this point of view.
71. 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
72. 3 HACKWORTH 231. This is part of the opinion cited supra note 70.
73. See the cases cited id. at 232 et seq.; In the Matter of W., 1 I. & N. DEC. 558
(B.I.A. 1943), in which the Board held that an oath of allegiance to the British
Crown sworn in Boston did not, of itself, expatriate W.
74. 54 STAT. 1169 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 803 (1946).
75. Ibid.
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within the United States results in expatriation upon the departure of
the citizen from the United States for residence abroad. In instances
where the full meaning of an oath is in doubt, investigation and decision
are undertaken by the administrative authorities on the merits of each
case.
LOSS BY NATURALIZED CITIZENS ON RESUMPTION OF FOREIGN
RESIDENCE
The second paragraph of Section 2, Act of March 2, 1907, pro-
vided that if a naturalized citizen returned to live for two years in the
state from which he emigrated, or for five years in any other foreign
state, it would be presumed that he lost his American nationality.
This presumption of loss of citizenship could be overcome by the pres-
entation of satisfactory evidence to a diplomatic or consular officer of
the United States.76 A study of the background of this proviso reveals
that it was included in the act for the purpose of freeing the United
States from the obligation of protecting naturalized American citizens
who took up foreign residence.
77
At first the State Department held that a person who was unable
to overcome the presumption of loss of citizenship was thereby ex-
patriated. 78  The rules for overcoming the presumption were simple.
A naturalized citizen could overcome the presumption by demonstrating
that he was residing abroad "solely as a representative of American
trade and commerce"; or "for health or education"; or that "some
unforeseen and controlling exigency" had prevented his return to the
United States. Such naturalized citizens must also show that they
intended to return to the United States. 79 These rules were later ex-
panded to include other categories of Americans engaged in various
types of business abroad."0 In all cases these naturalized Americans
had to prove that "they intend eventually to return to the United States
permanently to reside."
However, in 1910, Attorney General Wickersham, in effect, held
that these rules were irrelevant to loss of citizenship."' Since the law
was framed solely to relieve the State Department of the burden of
protecting naturalized citizens on extended stays abroad, Wickersham
76. 34 STAT. 1228 (1907).
77. See Citizenship, Expatriation, and Protection Abroad, H.R. Doc. No. 326,
59th Cong., 2d Sess., 23 et seq. (1906).
78. Acting Sec'y Bacon to Ambassador Riddle, May 29, 1908, id. at 290.
79. Cited by Flournoy, Naturalization and Expatriation, 31 YALE L.J. 702, 856
(1922).
80. Rules in effect April 21, 1926, cited by Hazard, International Problems in
Respect to Nationality by Naturalization and of Married Women, 20 PROc. Am. Soc.
INT'L L. 67, 75 (1926) ; see 3 HACKWORTI 310 for rules in effect in 1938.
81. 28 Ops. AT'y GEN. 504, 510 (1910).
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decided that the presumption only had relevance to protection and not
to loss of citizenship. The return of a naturalized American citizen to
the United States automatically rebutted the presumption, even though
the foreign residence might have extended over a long period. The
presumption of loss of citizenship could be infinitely extended in time,
but never actually effected loss of citizenship.
Attorney General Wickersham's interpretation of the statute was
not uniformly followed. The State Department, which understandably
was not fond of preparing ineffectual rules, kept a watchful eye on the
courts in hopes of discovering a basis for reversing the Attorney Gen-
eral's rule. Finally in 1916 the Southern District of New York held
squarely to the contrary, deciding that one Anderson had not succeeded
in rebutting the presumption of loss of citizenship and was, therefore,
expatriated. 2  The State Department immediately returned to its
original holding, but later in the year, probably after the same court in
Stein v. Fleischmann Co.13 upheld the Wickersham interpretation, it
also reassumed Wickersham's position."4 This zig-zag course con-
tinued until 1926, when Secretary of State Kellogg accepted Wicker-
sham's view." In all probability the retreat was motivated by the Su-
preme Court's dictum in 1924 that a presumption of loss of citizenship
based on foreign residence was "a presumption easy to preclude, and
easy to overcome. It is a matter of option and intention." 88
Thus from 1926 to the passage of the Nationality Act of 1940 the
second paragraph of Section 2, Act of March 2, 1907, related only to
loss of protection by naturalized citizens abroad.
However, the Department of State did not completely relinquish
its old point of view. It still wished extended residence abroad to effect
automatic loss of Americant citizenship. Thus, when it was proposed
that the United States codify and revise its nationality laws, the De-
partment of State seized the opportunity to write its interpretation into
the law of the land.
82. United States ex rel. Anderson v. Howe, 231 Fed. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
83. 237 Fed. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). For the State Dep't's reversal see 3 HACx-
woRTH 294.
84. Ibid.
85. Sec'y :ellogg to Att'y Gen. Sargent, Mar. 26, 1926, id. at 295; for shifts in
policy between 1916 and 1926 see id. at 294. The court decisions were confusing. See
in support of Wickersham: Camardo v. Tillinghast, 29 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1928);
United States v. Eliasen, 11 F.2d 785 (W.D. Wash. 1926); semble: United States v.
Gay, 264 U.S. 353 (1924) ; Miller v. Sinjen, 289 Fed. 388 (8th Cir. 1923); Banning
v. Penrose, 255 Fed. 159 (N.D. Ga. 1919). Contra: Nurge v. Miller, 286 Fed. 982
(E.D.N.Y. 1923); Sinjen v. Miller, 281 Fed. 889 (D. Neb. 1922). These cases are
in addition to those cited in the text.
86. United States v. Gay, supra note 85, at 358.
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The proposed Section 402 (b) of the Nationality Code eliminated
any reference to "presumption", providing that a naturalized citizen
of the United States would lose his nationality by
"residing continuously for three years in the territory of a foreign
state of which he was formerly a national or in which the place of
his birth is situated, " 87
Discussing this provision before a sub-committee of the House
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Mr. R. W. Flournoy,
State Department spokesman, expressed the opinion that:
"This . . . I should say is the most important proposed
change in the whole code, and may be the subject of some con-
troversy. . . . We have every day in the State Department,
cases of persons applying to us for passports or protection
. . . who have been naturalized in the United States and then
gone back and settled down in their native countries and resided
there for years. We think there should be some point at which
such person should lose not only his right to protection but his
citizenship itself. We consider it very undesirable that we should
have persons [abroad] who are not entitled to the protection of
our Government and yet remain as citizens of the United
States." 88
Pointing out that the Act of 1907 provided a presumption of loss of
citizenship which "never ripens into actual expatriation", Mr. Flour-
noy asked that, in cases where naturalized Americans returned to their
native lands, three years residence terminate United States citizenship
granted by naturalization. Subsequently in his testimony Flournoy
suggested that Congress should also provide for expatriation if a natu-
ralized American took up residence in a foreign country other than the
one from which he came."9 He called the attention of the congressmen
to the problem created by Zionists, born in Russia or Germany, natu-
ralized in the United States, but residing in Palestine. 0
The congressmen accepted Mr. Flournoy's advice and wrote it
into law as Section 404 of the Nationality Act of 1940."'
87. See 1 CODIFICATION OF THE NATIONALiTY LAWS OF THE UNITD STATES (H.R.
COmmITTE PRINT, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.) 69 (1939) (hereinafter cited CODIFICATION).
The reason for this provision was that such naturalized citizens "who resume residence
in the foreign lands from which they came are apt to renew old associations and ways
of living and thinking, and thus become merged in the native population, losing, to a
great degree, if not completely, their American character and feeling." Id. at 71.
88. 2 Hearings before Committee on Immigration and Naturalization on H.R.
6127, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 134 (1940) (hereinafter cited Nationality Hearings).
89. Id. at 140.
90. Ibid.
91. 54 STAT. 1170 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 804 (1946). Section 404 also provided that
the naturalized citizen would lose his nationality by a continuous two year stay in his
native land if such a stay reinvested him with his original citizenship. It was also
provided that a continuous five year stay abroad in any foreign country would effect
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Two further limitations were included in the Nationality Act.
Section 407 provided that an American minor residing abroad with
a parent who lost nationality under Section 404 should also lose his
nationality unless he re-established permanent residence in the United
States before his twenty-third birthday. 2
Section 409, after several amendments, declared that Sections 404
and 407 would be inoperative until October 14, 1946."3
These provisions have been detailed at some length for they rep-
resent a revolutionary change in citizenship policy. It should be em-
phasized that this legislation did not create a presumption of loss of
citizenship on the part of naturalized citizens remaining abroad. It
provided for automatic denationalization for those who could not claim
immunity under Sections 405 and 406. At the end of three years resi-
dence in his native land, or five years in any other state, a naturalized
citizen simply ceases to be an American. On the other hand, a native
born American, unless he commits one of the acts specified in Section
401, e.g., voting in a foreign election, can remain abroad for a lifetime
and retain his nationality. Thus, in a very real way, Congress created
second class citizens. Agreeing that some legislation on the subject
was necessary, was there any justification for classifying citizens on the
basis of birth versus naturalization? Was there any reason why these
provisions should not also apply to native born nationals? Further-
more, did Congress have the power to make such a classification?
It is possible that Congress could constitutionally create second
class citizenship. If it could be demonstrated that the classification
between citizens based on whether they were born or adopted bears a
reasonable relationship to a legitimate end, if it is supported by "con-
siderations of policy and practical convenience that cannot be con-
demned as arbitrary",94 then such a dichotomy could be sustained.
There seems to be little question but that the great mass of Americans
who have established residence in foreign countries were nationals by
adoption. Many people formerly came to this country to make money
and then returned to live in relative splendor in their native lands. It
could therefore be maintained that Congress utilized a legitimate classi-
loss of citizenship for naturalized Americans. Sections 405 and 406 provided certain
exceptions, e.g. residence abroad for reasons of: government service, for business (if
the business organization was located in the U. S.), for health, for certain educational
purposes. Naturalized citizens who had lived in the U. S. for over twenty-five years
after naturalization were exempted.
There were two further exceptions added in 1942 which provided for naturalized
citizens living abroad with their respective native born spouses or parents; and for
war veterans. ,56 STAT. 1043, 1085 (1942), 8 U.S.C. §§ 806g, 806h (1946).
92. Id. at § 807.
93. See ibid; 55 STAT. 743 (1941); 56 STAT. 779 (1942); 58 STAT. 747 (1944);
59 STAT. 544 (1945).
94. Cardozo, J., in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 584 (1937).
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fication, based on a reasonable and non-arbitrary distinction between
citizens by birth and by naturalization. Thus this could be considered
a distinction borne out in actual fact, justifying the establishment of
two grades of citizenship.
On the other hand, assuming that Congress has the power to pro-
vide for the divesting of citizenship, there is a strong tradition that it
cannot use any classification based on birth as opposed to naturaliza-
tion. Chief Justice Marshall stated in an early case that a naturalized
citizen
"is distinguishable in nothing from a native citizen, except so far
as the Constitution makes the distinction; the law makes none." "5
This dictum has since been echoed many times by the Supreme Court."
Thus, it can be maintained, the classification employed by Congress in
Section 404 is an arbitrary one, proscribed by the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution.
These issues were recently presented to the federal courts of the
District of Columbia by one Louis Bernard Lapides. Lapides was born
in Austria, naturalized in the United States,' and resided in Palestine
from 1934 to 1947. In 1947 he returned to the United States, but was
excluded as an alien on the ground that his residence in Palestine had
expatriated him. He brought action in the federal district court, under
Section 503 of the Nationality Act, for a declaratory judgment that he
was a citizen. The court dismissed Lapides' action without written
opinion, and Lapides appealed, maintaining that Section 404 (c) of the
Nationality Act was unconstitutional.98
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals agreed that Lapides
lost his United States citizenship. Emphasizing that the provision
under attack was primarily concerned with the conduct of foreign af-
fairs, the Court stated:
"The Act does not arbitrarily impose a loss of citizenship. It
deals with a condition voluntarily brought about by one's own
acts, with notice of the consequences. In that sense there is con-
currence by the citizen. . . . [In the case of Mackenzie v. Hare
95. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 737, 827 (1824).
96. See Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 22 (1913) ; United States v. Wong
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 703 (1898) ; Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 101 (1884) ; Minor
v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 165 (1875).
97. An arbitrary classification is forbidden by the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932) ; Blodgett v. Holden, 276 U.S.
594 (1928).
98. Lapides had previously attempted to get admitted through habeas corpus pro-
ceedings, claiming the I. & N.S. had no right to exclude him without a judicial determi-
nation of his citizenship. The court rejected his contention without ruling on his
citizenship. United States ex rel. Lapides v. Watkins, -165 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1948).
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the law provided] that any American woman marrying a foreigner
should take the nationality of her husband. The distinction thus
drawn between female citizens marrying Americans and those
marrying foreigners was held not to be an arbitrary exercise of
power, as it was dictated by a policy to avoid embarrassments and
controversies with foreign governments. In view of . . . [the
decision in Mackenzie v. Hare] supporting classification as be-
tween native born citizens, we cannot doubt that for a similar pur-
pose Congress has the power to distinguish between native born
and naturalized citizens." "
Judge Edgerton dissented. Noting that with the exception of the
limitation on the Presidency to native born citizens, the Constitution
makes no distinction between native born and naturalized citizens, he
urged that once an alien is naturalized he is completely merged in the
American community.
"Congress may expatriate citizens on reasonable grounds.
No doubt these may include five years residence abroad. But it
does not follow that Congress may expatriate some citizens and
not others on this ground. . . . Together with the immigration
law the Nationality Act makes it in effect a crime punishable by
banishment, which may well be called cruel and unusual, for some
citizens but not for others to live five years abroad." '0
Unfortunately, because of the importance of the issues involved,
the Supreme Court failed to grant certiorari in this case.
One peculiar situation which merits mention has arisen since the
passage of the Nationality Act. Section 409, it will be recalled, gave
naturalized Americans living abroad six years to get home. Until
October 14, 1946 naturalized American citizens living abroad longer
than the periods stipulated in the statute were divested of protection
under color of the Act of 1907, but not of citizenship under the Act of
1940. However, the administrative authorities changed the rules, hold-
ing in several cases that return to the United States did not rebut the
presumption of loss of citizenship.10' It should be added by way of ex-
planation, that the naturalized nationals concerned had lived for years
in Germany, and made no attempts to return to the United States until
the outbreak of war. Nonetheless, the Board of Immigration Appeals'
99. Lapides v. Clark, 176 F.2d 619 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860
(1949).
100. Ibid. Emphasis added.
101. See In the Matter of G., 1 I. & N. DEc. 398 (B.I.A. 1943) ; In the Matter
of B., 1 I. & N. DEc. 429 (B.I.A. 1943). The Board used the same approach in three
other cases, but found the presumption was rebutted. In the Matter of L., 1 I. & N.
DEC. 464 (B.I.A. 1943) ; In the Matter of B., 1 I. & N. DEc. 563 (B.I.A. 1943) ; In
the Matter of K., 1 I. & N. DEC. 587 (B.I.A. 1943).
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altering of the long-standing rule that return to the United States re-
butted the presumption of loss does not appear to be quite legitimate




Prior to the passage of the Expatriation Act of 1907 the effect of
the marriage of an American woman to an alien on her nationality was
in doubt. The Secretaries of State operated generally on the principle
that an American woman who married an alien lost her right to pro-
tection, and tended to consider that her American citizenship was in
abeyance during the period of her marriage. The courts were divided
on the point. Section 3 of the Act of 1907 settled this problem by
declaring that
"any American woman who marries a foreigner shall take
the nationality of her husband. At the termination of the marital
relation she may resume her American citizenship, if abroad, by
registering as an American citizen within one year with a consul
of the United States, or by returning to reside in the United
States, or if residing in the United States at the termination of the
marital relation, by continuing to reside therein." 103
The phrase "shall take the nationality of her husband" was naturally
interpreted as providing for loss of American nationality by such mar-
riage, although the United States was powerless to provide for the
woman's taking the nationality of her husband. She might, or might
not, obtain her husband's nationality, depending on the nationality law
of her husband's state.1
04
This enactment established a simple rule for future use: American
women marrying foreigners lost their nationality for the duration of
coverture. But could it be applied retrospectively? Did it deprive of
their nationality American women who before 1907 married foreign-
ers? One authority recommended that the phrase "who marries a.
foreigner" be construed to read "who marries or is married to a for-
eigner" thus making the "state of marriage . . . controlling as to the
102. Originally 54 STAT. 1171 (1940); as finally amended 59 STAT. 544 (1945),
8 U.S.C. § 809 (1946).
103. 34 STAT. 1228 (1907).
104. GE rTYs, LAW OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 120 (1934). The law
stated that registration should take place within one year, but the Dep't held this to
he "directory" and not "mandatory" so that registration could take place after one
year if cause for the delay was shown. Hover, Citizenship of Women in. the United
States, 26 Am. J. INT'L L. 700 (1932). What criteria were used to separate directory
from mandatory provisions is unknown; if this one year limit could be circumvented,
it would seem that any other provision could equally well be interpreted out of ex-
istence.
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native woman's citizenship, rather than the date of its inception." 105
Unfortunately, from the point of view of the State Department, which
justifiably looks with favor on nice neat rules, easy of administration,
this interpretation was not considered valid. After considering all the
factors involved, and particularly the Supreme Court's holding in
Mackenzie v. Hare 06 that the marriage of an American woman to an
alien expatriated her, since she contracted the marriage of her own voli-
tion with knowledge of the consequences, Secretary of State Hughes
ruled that this provision could not be given retrospective application." 7
With the failure to make this unifying interpretation controlling, ihe
decision as to whether such a marriage involved loss of citizenship was
left to individual courts. There has been no unity in the court decisions
on the point, for each district judge has attempted to determine the
issue for himself on the basis of pre-statutory precedents. 03
Elsewhere it was noted that the State Department did not believe
that expatriation could be effected in the United States.10 9 Did this
limitation on loss of nationality also apply to expatriation by marriage?
Logically speaking, this rule, if valid, should have universal application,
for an American married to a foreign husband in the United States is no
less subject to American jurisdiction than an American in the United
States who has sworn an oath of allegiance to a foreign state. How-
ever, in the case of Mackenzie v. Hare the Supreme Court held that
Mrs. Mackenzie, the American born wife of a resident British subject
living with her husband in California, had indeed lost her American
nationality. Pointing to the "ancient principle" of unity of husband
and wife, the Court declared that Congress intended this principle to
apply to all marriages of this type whether contracted within or with-
out the United States."0 It should be noted that the identity of hus-
band and wife was not an ancient principle of common law juris-
prudence so far as nationality was concerned. Unless there were
105. Hover, op. cit. supra note 104, at 710.
106. 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
107. Opinion of the Solicitor, Dep't of State, Jan. 24, 1925, approved by Sec'y
Hughes. 3 HACKwORTH 247.
108. For holdings that the marriage of an American woman with an alien prior
to 1907 resulted in her losing citizenship, see It re Wohlgemuth, 35 F.2d 1007 (W.D.
Mich. 1929); In re Krausmann, 28 F.2d 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1928) ; In re Page, 12
F.2d 135 (S.D. Cal. 1926). Contra: In re Lynch, 31 F.2d 762 (S.D. Cal. 1929) ;
Petition of Zogbaum, 32 F.2d 911 (D.S.D. 1929) ; In re Fitzroy, 4 F.2d 541 (D. Mass.
1925). The point at issue here, it should be emphasized, is not the retrospective
operation of the Act of 1907, but the law in effect prior to that date. The rule of
thumb devised by the Dep't of State was that if an American woman married an alien
prior to 1907 and took up permanent foreign residence with him prior to the passage
of the Cable Act in 1922, or if as a result of marriage she acquired the nationality of
her husband, she was considered to have lost her citizenship. UNrTE STATES CON-
sULAi REGULATIONS, 1933, 3 HACrWORTH 248.
109. See note 70 smpra.
110. 239 U.S. 299, 308 (1915).
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
statutory provision to the contrary, the marriage of an American or
British woman to an alien did not under the common law affect her
nationality."' Justice McKenna accepted the "Expatriation Act" of
1868 as legislation countervening the common law, although only the
preamble to this law dealt with expatriation, and preambles are of no
legal force." 2 However, the concern here is with the Court's holding
which established, in connection with this specific problem, that ex-
patriation by marriage under the Act of 1907 could take place in the
United States.
The Supreme Court's affirmation of the identity of husband and
wife raised another question. If an American woman married an
American national who subsequently transferred his allegiance to a
foreign state through naturalization or by swearing an oath of
allegiance, did his wife lose her American citizenship sumultaneously?
The State Department at first held that the nationality of the wife
should in all cases follow that of the husband." 3 Subsequently this
rule was modified insofar as it related to loss by oaths of allegiance,
so that the wife only lost her American citizenship if she acquired
foreign citizenship through the act of her husband. This modification
was endorsed in 1915 by Attorney General Gregory."14 However,
since most states granted citizenship to the wife of a naturalized per-
son," 5 the naturalization of an American husband in a foreign country
usually expatriated his wife.
The marriage of an American woman to a foreigner during her
minority was held to result in loss of United States citizenship.""6
Marriage during the period of American participation in World War I
111. "It had been the unexcepted doctrine of English common law that marriage
to an alien did not affect a woman's nationality." Hover, op. cit. supra note 104, at
703, and authorities cited.
112. The preamble of the United States Constitution, for example, is not the
source of any substantive power, but merely a declaration of the intention of the
framers. Jacobson v. Moss, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). "Both in England and in this
country it was at one time a common practice to prefix to each law a preface or pre-
amble stating the motives and inducement to the making of it; but it is not an essential
part of the statute . . . [and] is without force in a legislative sense, being but a
guide to the intentions of the framer. As such guide it is often of importance . . .
[and] is properly referred to when doubts or ambiguities arise upon the words of the
enacting part. It can never enlarge. It is no part of the law." State v. Superior Court,
92 Wash. 16, 159 Pac. 92 (1916). (Emphasis added.) The only reference to the
right of expatriation in the 1868 statute was in the preamble. The remainder of the
law was concerned with the protection of naturalized Americans abroad. To hold
that the preamble enacted the right of expatriation would be to hold that the preamble
enlarged the enacted part of the statute in an entirely different direction; i.e., trans-
ferring the force of the law from the protection of Americans abroad to the establish-
ment of the right of expatriation.
113. Opinion of Solicitor, Dep't State, Jan. 23, 1924, 3 HACKWORTH 254. Contra:
MS Dep't State, file 130 Kelly, Henrietta, ibid.
114. See Citizenship of Berryman, 30 Ops. Aviy GEr. 412 (1915).
115. Gettys, op. cit. . upra note 104, at 136.
116. Opinion of Solicitor, Dep't State, Sept. 27, 1928, 3 HAcKWORTH 272.
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did not result in loss of American nationality until the conclusion of the
official period of hostilities on July 2, 1921.117 An American woman
who lost citizenship by marriage automatically regained it on the an-
nulment of the marriage."" One interesting exception to the rule has
arisen in the cases of women who have both American nationality and
the nationality of their husbands at birth. Assuming that a woman
was born in the United States of British parents, thus gaining dual
nationality at birth, her subsequent marriage to a British subject would
not have extinguished her American citizenship, since she did not by
marriage obtain British nationality." 9
The discussion of loss by marriage thus far has been solely con-
cerned with the application of the Act of 1907. However, in 1922
Congress completely revolutionized the rules, authorizing, in the so-
called "Cable Act", independent citizenship for American women. This
enactment did not affect the validity of what has been discussed above-
the old rules and interpretation continued to be applied to marriages
contracted between 1907 and 1922.120 However, from 1922 on the
"ancient principle of identity of husband and wife" was completely
abandoned. Section 3 of the Cable Act declared:
"That a woman citizen of the United States shall not cease
to be a citizen of the United States by reason of her marriage after
the passage of this Act, unless she makes a formal renunciation of
her citizenship . . . Provided, That any woman citizen who
marries an alien ineligible to citizenship shall cease to be a citizen
of the United States. If at the termination of the marital status
she is a citizen of the United States she shall retain her citizenship
regardless of her residence." 121
With the passage of this statute, loss of American nationality by mar-
riage was limited to two groups: those who married aliens ineligible
for citizenship, and those who renounced their American citizenship.
The State Department soon added a third group: those who in con-
nection with marriage to an alien performed "a positive, affirmative act
required by the law of her husband's state as a prerequisite to the ac-
quisition of his nationality." 122 Each of these modes of lo.ss deserves
brief elaboration.
The marriage of an American woman to an alien ineligible to
citizenship carried with it loss of American nationality. The primary
117. See 39 Ops. Arry GE.N. 474 (1940).
118. MS Dep't State, file 130 L., M.M., 3 HACKWoRTH 253.
119. MS Dep't State, file 130 Beauce, Marie E., 3 id. at 248.
120. The Cable Act included a statement precluding retrospective operation of the
repeal of section 3 of the Act of 1907. 42 STAT. 1022 (1922).
121. Ibid.
122. MS Dep't State, file 130 Dupont, Dorothy D., 3 HACKWORTH 259.
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groups affected by this proviso were Chinese-Americans and Japanese-
Americans who frequently married alien Chinese and Japanese hus-
bands who were ineligible for citizenship.' 23 It also would have ex-
patriated any American woman who married an alien who was in-
eligible for citizenship due to deserting the United States armed forces,
leaving the country to avoid the draft, or withdrawing his declaration
of intention in order to plead alienage as a bar to military service.'24
Happily, this piece of discriminatory legislation was repealed in 1931,"2'
so that today marriage per se in no case effects loss of American nation-
ality.1
2 6
The provision that an American woman might renounce her citi-
zenship was subsequently amended to forbid such renunciation in war-
time, or "if war shall be declared within one year after such renuncia-
tion then . . . [it] shall be void." 127 This renunciation had to be
made before a court; it could not be made before a consular officer of
the United States.' 28  The Nationality Act of 1940 repealed this re-
nunciation provision, but declared that any American citizen, male or
female, could lose citizenship by renunciation before a consular offi-
cer.'29 Since this latter enactment was far broader than the previous
ones-which related solely to marriage-it will be discussed separately.
The State Department's decision that marriage plus an affirmative
act was equivalent to expatriation was apparently based on the assump-
tion that if an American woman took action to obtain her husband's
nationality, she thereby became naturalized in a foreign state. Inas-
much as the Department consistently ruled that foreign citizenship and
123. For a discussion of some of the effects of this provision see 14 GEo. LJ. 202
(1926).
124. See Hazard, International Problems in Respect to Nationality by Naturaliza-
tion and of Married Women, 20 PROc. Am. Soc. INT'L L. 67, 71n (1926).
125. 46 STAT. 1511 (1931).
126. Krichefsky, in Loss of United States Nationality: Expatriation, 4 I. & N.S.
MONTHLY REv. 9, 14 (1946) states that two persons "lost citizenship by marriage to
a treaty national" during fiscal 1945. Yet the State Department has held that even in
cases where American women are supposed under the terms of a treaty to lose their
citizenship on marriage to a national of the state with which the treaty was concluded,
such loss of nationality will not be recognized. This was determined on the premise
that "it appeared to be the clear intent of Congress that no woman should lose her
American citizenship as a consequence of her marriage to an alien." Opinion of the
Solicitor, Dep't State, Aug. 17, 1927; Dep't State to Consul Gen. at Montreal, Sept.
24, 1931, 3 HACKWORTH 264. It is possible that the Department has modified this rule
since the appearance of Hackworth's compilation. Unfortunately the Department did
not allow this writer to use its files in preparing this analysis, so that Mrs. Krichef-
sky's statement is at present inexplicable.
127. 48 STAT. 797 (1934). Undoubtedly due to an oversight in drafting, no
reference was made to the previous provision on this subject, nor was § 3 of the Cable
Act repealed until 1940. However, the administrative authorities took the logical
position that the Act of 1934 amended the Cable Act by implication. 3 HACKWORTH
263.
128. Att'y Gen. Dougherty to Sec'y Hughes, Apr. 6, 1923 3 id. 263.
129. 54 STAT. 1169 (1940), 8 U.S.C. §801f (1946).
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its benefits bestowed on an American woman without application on
her part did not expatriate her,'" it seems quite reasonable that when
an American woman did take positive action resulting in the acquisition
of her husband's citizenship she should be considered as expatriated
under Section 2 of the Act of 1907, as having obtained naturalization
in a foreign state. Persons in this category today are expatriated under
color of Section 401 (a) of the Nationality Act. 3 '
The discussion so far has been concerned with the methods of
expatriation established by the Expatriation Act of 1907. It is now
necessary to launch into the study of the new methods by which dena-
tionalization can take place created by the Nationality Act of 1940 and
its amendments.
Loss BY SERVICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF A FOREIGN STATE
Section 401 (c) of the Nationality Act of 1940 declared that
'United States citizenship would be lost by
"Entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state
unless expressly authorized by the laws of the United States, if
he has or acquires the nationality of such foreign state." 132
It should be noted that this provision is considerably narrower in scope
than the other denationalization sections. While, under Section 401
(b), United States citizenship is lost by simply swearing an oath of
allegiance to a foreign state, nationality is not lost by a person serving
in the foreign armed forces unless he "has or acquires the nationality
of such foreign state." Under Section 403 (b) of the Nationality Act
no American national could lose citizenship in this manner unless he
were over eighteen years of age.
1 3
The purpose of Section 401 (c) was to denationalize Americans
who served in foreign armies but did not swear an oath of allegiance.
As originally presented to Congress it did not include the sentence "if
he has or acquires the nationality of such foreign state." 13' Fournoy,
130. See Circular instruction to diplomatic and consular officers, July 15, 1936, 3
HACKwORTH 259. But see Citizenship of Berryman, 30 Ops. Ar'y GEN. 412 (1915).
131. 54 STAT. 1169 (1940); 8 U.S.C. §801a (1946). The Expatriation Act of
1907 provided for loss of citizenship for a woman who had acquired U. S. citizenship
by marriage, unless she registered with an American consul if living abroad or con-
tinued to live in the U. S. The Cable Act of 1922, however, changed all this with its
provision that foreign women could not attain U. S. citizenship merely by marrying
U. S. citizens.
132. 54 STAT. 1169 (1940), 8 U.S.C. §801c (1946).
133. 54 STAT. 1170 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 803b (1946). Nor under § 403a could
citizenship be thus lost unless the person had left the jurisdiction of the United States.
134. See 1 CODIFICATION 66.
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the State Department representative at the congressional hearings on
the Nationality Act, justified the original provision, stating
"it does not seem reasonable that a person should give himself
up and risk his life for the good of a foreign state and remain a
citizen of the United States, although it may be reasonable to pro-
vide for recovering the citizenship readily in such cases." '
The House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization approved
the section without the qualifying clause, but the Senate insisted on an
amendment limiting the operation of this provision to persons who had
or acquired the nationality of the foreign state by serving in its armed
forces.1
3 6
In interpreting this section the administrative authorities have
been faced with two major problems: the definition of "armed forces",
and the determination whether certain executive agreements signed by
President Roosevelt constituted an express authorization of foreign
service. In various cases the Board of Immigration Appeals held that
a dual national of the United States and Canada who joined the Cana-
dian Officers' Training Corps 13 or the Queens University Air Re-
serve "8 did not lose his United States citizenship, as neither of these
organizations was an active component of the Canadian armed services.
However, service in the Canadian Air Force by such a dual national
extinguished his American nationality. 9 The executive agreements
were construed line by line--one is tempted to say between the lines as
well-and it was determined that a dual national of the United States
and Mexico who was drafted into the Mexican Army after the conclu-
sion of the Executive Agreement with Mexico on January 22, 1943,
did not thereby lose his American citizenship. 140  On the other hand,
the agreements with Great Britain and Canada were conversely inter-
preted, so that a dual national of the United States and Canada, 14 1 or
of the United States and Britain,'42 would lose his American nationality
since his service "was not expressly authorized by the laws of the
United States." The Executive Agreement of June 13, 1944, with
China was held to protect the American nationality of a dual national
if he was drafted into the Chinese Army, but not if he enlisted! 4
135. Nationality Hearings 131.
136. See SEN. REP. No. 2150, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1940).
137. In the Matter of 0., file #56108/718 (B.I.A. 1942) ; In the Matter of Z.,
file #A-7791053 (B.I.A. 1945).
138. In the Matter of L.F., file #56158/952 (I. & N.S. 1946).
139. In the Matter of W., 1 I. & N. DEC. 558 (B.I.A. 1943).
140. In the Matter of K.G., file #56158/676 (B.I.A.), approved by Att'y Gen.
(1945).
141. In the Matter of S., file #A-6458448 (B.I.A. 1947).
142. In the Matter of F., file #D-737, cited by Rudnick, Loss of Nationality in
Conjunction with Foreign Military Service, 6 I. & N.S. MONTHLY REv. 9, 12 (1948).
143. Rudnick, op. cit. supra note 142, at 12.
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Since Section 401 (c) did not go into effect until January 13,
1941, and was not retroactive, it has been held that a dual national who
entered the armed forces of the foreign state of his twin nationality
prior to that date did not expatriate himself. Such a person being under
obligation to complete his period of service, his remaining in the foreign
army after January 13, 1941 could not be considered "voluntary". 44
Similarly, a dual national of the United States and Portugal who was
drafted into the Portugese Army against his will was recently held to
be a United States citizen, reaffirming the rule that expatriation must
be based on voluntary action.145 However, the person affected must
prove duress; 146 mere induction under compulsory draft laws does not
constitute duress unless the individual protested this action to the best
of his ability.
147
Another question arose with regard to a minor with dual nation-
ality who entered the armed forces of the state of his twin allegiance
before he reached the age of eighteen. In this event, he could not have
been expatriated by his entrance due to minority, but did his continued
service after reaching eighteen expatriate him? Secretary of State
Marshall referred this problem to Attorney General Clark in 1947, and
the Attorney General ruled that
". .. My conclusion is that continued service after the age
of eighteen, whether the service began prior thereto by voluntary
enlistment or by involuntary induction, is not alone sufficient to
cause loss of United States nationality. I think such continued
service would be sufficient, however, in any case in which it was
reasonably possible for the individual concerned to obtain a dis-
charge and he, knowing that he could obtain discharge, failed to
do so within a reasonable time after reaching eighteen years." 148
Loss BY ACCEPTING OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT
Section 401 d of the Nationality Act provided that an American
would lose his citizenship by
"Accepting, or performing the duties of, any office, post, or
employment under the government of a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof for which only nationals of such state are
eligible." 149
144. In the Matter of A., file #56158/416 (B.I.A.), approved by Att'y Gen.
(1945).
145. Dos Reis ex rel. Camera v. Nicolls, 161 F.2d 860 (1st Cir. 1947). See also
Ishikawa v. Acheson, 85 F. Supp. 1 (D. Hawaii 1949).
146. Podea v. Marshall, 83 F. Supp. 216, 223 (E.D.N.Y. 1949).
147. In the Matter of C., file #A-6375524 (B.I.A. 1947).
148. 40 Ops. ATr'y GEN. 553 (1947).
149. 54 STAT. 1169 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 801d (1946). Accepting or performing
such a job within the United States would not, under § 403a, cost an American his
citizenship, unless he later took residence abroad.
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Presumably an American who accepted such a position as a minor, or
before the passage of the Nationality Act, would lose his nationality if
he continued so to serve.
The primary task faced by the administrators in the operation of
this provision was the determination of which posts foreign govern-
ments reserve exclusively for occupation by their nationals. For ex-
ample, the Board of Immigration Appeals held that an American who
took a school teaching job in Canada,'5 ° a job as a forest ranger in
Mexico,3'' a position on a Canadian price control board, 52 or a posi-
tion in the Canadian Civil Service,""3 did not thereby lose his American
nationality. On the other hand, an American who took a police job
in Mexico was thereby expatriated.Y Unfortunately the Department
of State has not made available its determinations under this section
so that the above list does not pretend to be comprehensive. However,
the Department is keeping a watchful eye on Americans abroad who
accept foreign office or employment. 15
Loss BY VOTING IN A FOREIGN ELECTION
Section 401 (e) of the Nationality Act of 1940 declared that an
American would lose his citizenship by
"Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participat-
ing in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over
foreign territory." '"
The rationale offered for this provision was that participation in the
affairs of another nation carries with it an allegiance which is incon-
sistent with American nationality.1
7
The primary problem created for the administrators by this sec-
tion was the definition of a "political election." If an American voted
for a dog-catcher in Lyons or a melon inspector in Iran, did this act
cost him his nationality? On what basis could a "political election"
150. In the Matter of S., 1 I. & N. DEc. 304 (B.I.A. 1942).
151. In the Matter of S. P., file #56156/765 (B.I.A. 1944).
152. In the Matter of R., file #56156/670 (B.I.A. 1944).
153. In the Matter of W., file #56172/261 (B.I.A. 1945). This was a complicated
case since the Canadians allow British nationals to serve in their Civil Service. W.
held both American and British nationality by birth and was thus eligible. The Board
felt that under these conditions he should not be penalized for his British nationality.
Whether the same decision would be reached in the case of an American without dual
nationality is problematical.
154. In the Matter of M. P., file #56156/190 (B.I.A. 1945).
155. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 1, 1949, p. 33, col. 6.
156. 54 STAT. 1169 (1940), 8 U.S.C. §801e (1946). Sec. 403a forbids expatria-
tion on this ground while within the United States, so that an American who cast
an absentee ballot in a foreign election (unless he later took up foreign residence)
would not thereby be expatriated!
157. 1 CoD'IcATIoN 67.
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be distinguished from a non-political election? One criterion was
suggested by Assistant Secretary of State Berle, who said the test is
. .. whether political issues are involved or the campaign is being
waged along political lines between candidates of opposing political
parties." 158
Following this line of reasoning the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals decided that a person voting in a non-partisan school board elec-
tion in Canada was not thereby expatriated.'59 However, the Board
previously ruled that voting in a Canadian municipal election, most
of which are conducted on an officially non-partisan basis, did cost an
American his citizenship since the right to vote in such elections was,
by statute, extended only to British subjects. 6 ' This was true even if
the person voting did so in violation of Canadian law.'""
The process of divination used to separate non-political from
political elections has also been applied to referenda. In 1942 the
Canadian government held a "Dominion Plebiscite" to determine the
attitude of the people towards sending drafted troops overseas. The
Liberal Party of Mackenzie King found itself trapped behind an elec-
tion pledge not to send such troops abroad, and used this device as a
trial balloon. Inevitably Americans voted in this referendum, and a
problem was created for the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Was this inspired political maneuver a "political election"? The Board
of Immigration Appeals, relying on a common sense approach, held
that this plebiscite was not a "political election" but a glorified public
opinion poll conducted under official auspices. Pointing out that the
result was not binding on the Canadian government, the Board said
"the term 'political election' extends to a vote upon a question submitted
for the determination of the electorate." 162 In other words, the basis
for distinguishing a political from a non-political election was the con-
clusive nature of the vote rather than the subject matter.
But this interpretation also had its drawbacks. A vote in some
foreign town on the question of whether or not to extend the sidewalks
fifty feet thus became a "political election." In 1946 the Board was
confronted with the question of whether voting in a municipal "local
option" referendum in Canada expatriated an American woman. The
158. Berle to Bowers, Oct. 9, 1941, cited In the Matter of F., file #56156/450
(B.I.A. 1946).
159. In the Matter of C., file #56175/489 (B.I.A. 1945). See also In the Matter
of R.R., file #A-6877345 (B.I.A. 1950) where it was held that voting for the officers
of a rural farm cooperative organized by the Mexican government was voting in a
political election.
160. In the Matter of P., 1 I. & N. DEC. 267 (B.I.A. 1942).
161. In the Matter of ?, file #56158/91 (B.I.A. date unknown) ; In the Matter
of N., file #A-6930351 (B.I.A. 1950).
162. In the Matter of H., 1 I. & N. DEc. 239, 247 (B.I.A. 1942) (on application
for reconsideration).
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Board asked Mr. Flournoy, then Legal Advisor to the State Depart-
ment, for his views, and Flournoy stated it was not a "political elec-
tion." " The Board of Immigration Appeals accepted this view, but
was reversed by the Attorney General. 6" As Mr. Clark did not see fit
to divulge his criteria for separating one election from another the ques-
tion must be considered open.
However, these are borderline cases. The majority of those which
arise can be decided on a rather simple basis. Although the State
Department has not divulged any material on the subject, apparently
several thousand Americans lost their citizenship by voting in the
critical Italian election of April, 1948.165 The American Consul at Haifa
warned United States citizens against voting in the recent Israeli elec-
tion.166 Participation in a general election in a foreign state is obviously
voting in a "political election". Unquestionably any American who
voted in the recent referendum to determine the future sovereignty of
French India, or in the United Nations' Kashmir plebiscite, would lose
his citizenship.
Citizenship can not be lost under color of this provision by any
American under eighteen years of age. Nor does it apply to a person
who voted under duress. Approximately seven hundred Japanese-
Americans voted in the Japanese general election in April, 1946.167
The Department of State held that they had thereby expatriated them-
selves, but a United States District Court reversed this holding on two
counts. First, it determined that occupied Japan was not a "foreign
state" within the meaning of the statute, but a sort of United States
mandate ruled by an American proconsul. Second, both psychological
and actual duress were applied to the plaintiffs to get them to vote, so
that even if Japan were a foreign state their voting would not have re-
sulted in expatriation. 6 '
Loss BY RENUNCIATION IN A FoREIGN STATE
Section 401 (f) of the Nationality Act of 1940 provided that
American nationality would be lost by formal renunciation. 6 9 This
section was explained as being designed for dual nationals.
163. Opinion of Aug. 4, 1945, cited In the Matter of F., supra note 189.
164. Ibid.
165. See editorial, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1949, p. 6E, col. 2: "A joint resolu-
tion has been introduced in both houses of Congress to exempt the two or three thou-
sand Americans in Italy who have lost their citizenship ..
166. N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1949, p. 9, col.1.
167. American Civil Liberties Union, Monthly Bulletin, May, 1949.
168. Arikawa v. Acheson, 83 F. Supp. 473 (S.D. Cal. 1949). For a decision
that duress was not present in the 1946 election in Hungary, see Kazdy-Reich v. Mar-
shall, 88 F. Supp. 787 (D.D.C. 1950). See also Brehm v. Acheson, 90 F. Supp. 662
(S.D. Tex. 1950) ; Ouye v. Acheson, 91 F. Supp. 129 (D. Hawaii 1950).
169. 54 STAT. 1169 (1940), 8 U.S.C. §801f (1946).
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". . . who, upon reaching majority, elect the nationality of
a foreign state. It is obvious that such persons cannot obtain
naturalization in the foreign state, since they are [already] na-
tionals thereof, and it frequently happens that there are no pro-
visions in the laws of the foreign state . . . under which they
may take an oath or make a formal affirmation of allegiance
thereto, and thus divest themselves of their American nationality
under the provision of [Section 401 (b)]. . . . This provision
may also be of use to American nationals who, upon marrying
aliens, acquire the nationality of their alien husbands or wives,
and who may desire to have their American nationality termi-
nated." 170
The Secretary of State immediately provided a standard form
for the renunciation of American citizenship, and apparently no re-
nunciation is valid unless this form is used. 71  During the fiscal year
1945, the only one for which statistics have been revealed, three hun-
dred and forty-four American nationals expatriated themselves in
this manner. It has apparently been utilized by several young Ameri-
cans as a protest against "separate national sovereignties," these ideal-
ists becoming on completion of the procedure "World Citizens".
7 2
Americans under eighteen are barred from thus expatriating them-
selves by the statute.17 3  Presumably if someone under eighteen did
slip by, the doctrine of "confirmatory acts" would be employed to de-
termine whether he retained his intention of renunciation after reach-
ing majority. It is difficult to conceive of duress in the operation of
this provision, but unquestionably if it could be proved that the oath
of renunciation was taken under pressure, loss of nationality would not
result therefrom. The statutory provision that loss of citizenship
under Section 401 (f) will not result from an oath of renunciation
taken in the United States 174 is in this case superfluous, since the only
people qualified to administer the oath are the foreign representatives
of the State Department.
Loss BY COMMITTING TREASON
Section 401 (h) declared that an American would lose his citizen-
ship by conviction of "any act of treason against, or attempting by
force to overthrow or bearing arms against the United States"YU
170. 1 CODIFICATmoN 67.
171. Dep't State, Departmental Order No. 908, Jan. 2, 1941.
172. World Government News, July 1948; N.Y. Times, July 8, 1949, p. 6, col. 4.
173. 54 STAT. 1170 (1940), 8 U.S.C. §803b (1946).
174. 54 STAT. 1169 (1940), 8 U.S.C. §803a (1946).
175. 54 STAT. 1169 (1940), 8 U.S.C. §801h (1946).
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This provision was not in the Nationality Act as suggested by the
President's Committee,'78 nor was it in the draft as approved by the
House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. 1 7  It was
added during the discussion on the floor of Congress at the suggestion
of the Senate Committee on Immigration.
7
1
It should be noted that this provision penalizes more than mere
treason. Its proscription encompasses those who "attempt by force
to overthrow" the government of the United States.
This provision raises several problems. In the first place, the
statutory limitation to persons over eighteen years of age does not
apply to Section 401 (h) .17' This could indicate that Congress felt that
age was irrelevant to the commission of, and punishment for, treason.
On the other hand, in view of the tradition that a minor could not
expatriate himself, it could indicate that Congress did not intend this
section to apply to Americans under twenty-one-the legal age of
majority. A second problem is concerned with the application of this
provision. What is to be done to put it into effect? Is the person
convicted of treason upon his release from jail to be put, like Hale's
Man Without A Country, on a boat to sail the seven seas to the end of
his days? The Constitution forbids his being branded "EXP" and
turned loose, so how can persons expatriated under this provision-
stateless persons in the full sense of the term-be distinguished from
other members of society once they have completed their terms in
prison? Presumably the answer to this question must await the
release from jail of "Axis Sally" Gillars and Edward Best, both
recently convicted of treason.
It should be noted that this provision is a probable result of con-
gressional refusal to distinguish between loss of citizenship and loss of
the rights of citizenship. What the congressmen probably intended
was that anyone who was convicted of treason would lose his civil
rights-a stipulation which already appears in part on the statute
books.' In the sense that it is used in Section 401 (h), loss of nation-
ality is a penalty measure not unlike the old practice of banishment em-
ployed by the Greeks against Aristiades and Themistocles. Presumably
a Presidential pardon would carry with it reinstatement of nationality.
Cases of treason are few and far between, so that the problems dis-
176. 1 CODIFICAxrIo 68.
177. Nationality Hearings, 358.
178. 86 CONG. REc. 12431 (1940).
179. 54 STAT. 1170 (1940), 8 U.S.C. §803b (1946).
180. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1948). A person convicted of treason, in addition to exe-
cution, or imprisonment and fine, "shall be incapable of holding any office under the
United States." For a discussion of this general problem, see Gathings, Loss of
Citizenship and Civil Rights for Conviction of Crime, 43 Am. POL. ScI. REv. 1228
(1949).
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cussed above will probably never assume serious proportions. How-
ever, if this section were interpreted to embrace those like the Minne-
apolis Trotskyites, or the leaders of the American Communist Party,
convicted of "advocating the overthrow of the Government of the
United States by force and violence," a more serious problem would be
created.
RENUNCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES
The Act of July 1, 1944 amended the Nationality Act of 1940,
adding a provision that in time of war American citizenship would be
lost by renunciation in the United States, subject for security reasons
to the consent of the Attorney General. 81 The background of this
amendment is very interesting. In 1942 all alien Japanese and citizen
Japanese-Americans living in the Pacific coast states were apprehended
as a security measure, and herded into concentration camps designated
"relocation centers." Subsequently, in an attempt to segregate the
"loyal" from the "disloyal," the War Relocation Authority, which ad-
ministered the relocation centers, asked each inmate to fill out a ques-
tionnaire. All citizen males were called upon to answer two specific
questions considered relevant to "loyalty."
"27. Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the
United States on combat duty, wherever ordered?
28. Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United
States of America and faithfully defend the United States from
any or all attack by foreign or domestic forces, and forswear any
form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese Emperor, or any
other foreign government, power, or organization." 182
These questions were also asked of citizen women with the exception
that they were queried as to whether they would volunteer for the Army
Nurse Corps or the Women's Army Corps."s
7,272 Nisei refused to swear unqualified allegiance.' This re-
fusal however, was due to far more than disloyalty-although unques-
tionably some Japanese-Americans were disloyal."8 5
181. 58 STAT. 677 (1944), 8 U.S.C. §801i (1946).
182. Cited in Hearings before Committee on Immigration and Naturalization on
H.R. 2701, 3012, 3489, 3446, 4103, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1944).
183. Ibid.
184. Ibid.
185. Important factors for such refusal were, in the words of the Acting Director
of the War Relocation Authority:
"(a) A protest against what many evacuees believed to be a violation of their
rights as citizens. .
(b) In certain blocks at some centers, community pressure was very strong and
the fear of physical violence apparently deterred some from answering affirmatively.
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However, the West Coast congressmen were not interested in
motivation, and soon introduced several bills in Congress to deprive
persons who refused to swear unqualified allegiance of their citizen-
ship."
8'
Attorney General Biddle appeared before the House Committee
on Immigration and Naturalization and succeeded in convincing the
Committee that a less drastic measure would suffice. Section 401 (i)
was the wording he suggested, and the Congress agreed to this form.""
Approximately 5,000 Japanese-Americans renounced their United
States citizenship under this provision.' 8
The Japanese-American renunciants were interned until the con-
clusion of the war, the intention being to deport them as soon as such
an operation was feasible. However, with the conclusion of the war
many of the Nisei began to regret their hasty action and some of them
instituted habeas corpus proceedings, claiming that they were unlaw-
fully held in custody as aliens. Their renunciations, it was claimed, had
been executed under duress, so that the oath had not really cost them
their American nationality. In 1947, a sweeping decision of the South-
ern District of California ruled that five Nisei had indeed renounced
their nationality under duress. By implication, this decision under-
mined the whole government position, for the Nisei declared to be
citizens were typical of the great majority of the group.
First, the court pointed out that plaintiff Inouye had renounced
his citizenship at the age of seventeen. The Nationality Act provided
that with the exception of Sections 401 (g), 401 (h) and 401 (i), no
(c) Some of the evacuees insisted they owed no allegiance to Japan, that to for-
swear allegiance would be an admission they once had such allegiance, and that they
could not forswear that which they never had possessed.
(d) Resentment at evacuation.
(e) A fear that a certain answer would result in the separation from their
families. . .
(f) A fear that an affirmative answer to both questions was equivalent to im-
mediate volunteering in the armed forces. [Males answering 'yes' to question 27
were required to fill out an 'Application for Voluntary Induction.'] Many of the
young males felt responsible for dependents, and felt they could not volunteer, at least
until the status of their dependents should be clarified. ...
(h) A fear that racial intolerance in the United States was such that there would
be no opportunity for them to live in peace and security in the United States after
the war. ...
(i) A fear that an affirmative answer meant forced relocation at an early date in
a new, strange, and possibly hostile part of the United States. Many had lost heavily
by the evacuation, felt unable to face the outside world at once, and sought refuge in
an answer which would give them time to get their bearings." Id. at 39. See the
excellent study of this problem in Knic, THE LoYALTIES OF MEN IN CRIsis (unpub-
lished thesis, Cornell University, 1950).
186. Congresmen Johnson, Engle, and Sheppard of California, id. at 2, 10, 13.
187. Id. at 43.
188. See Krichefsky, Loss of United States Nationality: Expatriation, 4 I. & N.S.
MONTHLY Rxv. 9, 11 (1946).
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national under eighteen years of age could be expatriated. 9 This was
interpreted by the government to mean that age was no limitation on
expatriation under Section 401 (i) providing for renunciation in the
United States. The court rejected this contention, stating that the
purpose of this provision was to lower the age limit on loss of citizen-
ship for the specified grounds (voting in a foreign election, serving in
a foreign army, etc.) from twenty-one to eighteen. Where this lower
age limit was not specified, the Judge implied, the legal age of majority
-twenty-one--should be assumed.190
Second, the renunciations of all five were declared invalid as ob-
tained under duress. True, no one had forced these Nisei to sign, but
"The modern view and true doctrine of duress and coercion
[based on] threats and fear of actual or apparent physical
injury or violence producing a state of mind of the injured party
... [depends on] whether such person was deprived of the free
exercise of his will power. Freedom of will is essential in the
exercise of an act which is urged to be binding, and the right of
citizenship . . . can only be waived as the result of free and in-
telligent choice." 191
The United States appealed this determination, and obtained a reversal
on a jurisdictional point. The appellate court did not discuss the sub-
stance of the decision below.
192
Encouraged by this decision, Tadayasu Abo and Mary Furuya
introduced action in the District Court, Northern District of California,
on behalf of 2300 renunciants. They were exceptionally fortunate in
their judge, for Goodman, D. J., wrote a brilliant and cogent opinion
combining sociology and jurisprudence in a manner reminiscent of
Justice Brandeis. Describing the conditions in the relocation camps,
the Judge held that although undoubtably some Nisei renounced of
their own free will, the great majority were coerced. "The renunciants
acted abnormally because of abnormal conditions not of their own mak-
ing." :11 On this basis he held that unless the United States wished to
introduce evidence in specific cases to prove that the renunciation was
taken without coercion-presumably by a pro-Japanese-all 2300 Nisei
must be held citizens of the United States. He concluded:
"The Government of the United States under the stress and
necessities of national defense, committed error in accepting the
renunciations of the greater number of the plaintiffs herein. ...
189. 54 STAT. 1170 (1940), 8 U.S.C. §§801 g, h, and i (1946).
190. Inouye v. Clark, 73 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
191. Id. at 1004.
192. Clark v. Inouye, 175 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1949).
193. Tadlayasu Abo v. Clark, 77 F. Supp. 806, 811 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
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The Government must be neither reluctant nor evasive in correct-
ing wrongs inflicted upon a citizen. By so doing it demonstrates
to the people of the world the fairness and justice of our form of
society and law." 194
While the Inouye decision was reversed at the appellate level with
no discussion of the issues of the renunciation, and the Abo case ap-
parently was not appealed, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
undertook in a separate piece of litigation to settle the substantive issue.
Miye Mae Murakami and two others, American citizens of Japanese
ancestry, sued Secretary of State Acheson to cancel their wartime re-
nunciations. They claimed that under the conditions which existed on
the Pacific coast in 1942, these repudiations of nationality were in fact
exacted under duress. The Southern District of California rendered
judgment for the Nisei women, and the United States appealed. Chief
Judge Denman, in an opinion bristling with hostility towards the war-
time treatment of the Japanese-Americans,' 95 held that the renuncia-
tions were "null, void and canceled" as based on mental fear, intimida-
tion and coercion.! 6 Apparently there has been no appeal from this
decision, so the renunciation problem appears to have been finally
settled.
There will be no more such renunciations-for the moment at
least-as Section 401 (i) was a wartime measure which became inop-
erative on July 24, 1947.197 As far as the record discloses, the Japanese-
Americans were the only persons to resort to this statute.
Loss BY DESERTION-THE OLD LAW AND ITS SUCCESSORS
Section 401 (g) of the Nationality Act of 1940 provided that any
American would lose his citizenship by deserting the armed forces of
the United States in wartime. 9" Section 401 (j), added by the Act of
September 27, 1944, declared that anyone who left or remained outside
the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, "for the purpose of
evading or avoiding training and service in the land or naval forces of
the United States" was subject to denationalization.' 99 These sections
were the logical successors of an old desertion statute.
194. Ibid.
195. Judge Denman, it should be added, had stated his opinion of the evacuation
of the American-Japanese in similar uninhibited terms in 1942. See Korematsu v.
United States, 140 F.2d 289, 300 (9th Cir. 1943).
196. Acheson v. Murakami, 176 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1949).
197. See 61 STAT. 451, 454 (1947).
198. 54 STAT. 1169 (1946), 8 U.S.C. §801g (1946).
199. 58 STAT. 746 (1944), 8 U.S.C. §801j (1946).
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The Act of March 3, 1865 provided that any person who there-
after deserted the United States armed forces was deemed
". .. to have voluntarily relinquished and forfeited their
rights of citizenship and their rights to become citizens; and such
deserters shall be forever incapable of . . . exercising any rights
of citizens [of the United States]." 200
The meaning of the phrase "rights of citizenship" was never adjudi-
cated, although courts had decided that conviction by a court-martial
and approval by the President were procedural prerequisites to enforce-
ment.2 01
In 1912, this statute was amended by making its provisions appli-
cable to any person who in wartime deserted the armed forces or,
". .. being duly enrolled, departs the jurisdiction of the dis-
trict in which he is enrolled, or goes beyond the limits of the
United States, with intent to avoid any draft into the military or
naval service." 202
Although there were no judicial decisions on the subject, this law must
have affected a large group of people during World War I. This fact
can be deduced from President Coolidge's "Proclamation of Amnesty"
of March 5, 1924, in which he declared:
"... Whereas, many persons who deserted from the mili-
tary or naval service of the United States on or after November
11, 1918, and therefore were duly convicted of desertion com-
mitted in time of war, are now leading blameless lives and have
reestablished themselves in the confidence of their fellow citizens,
. . . Now, therefore, be it known, that I, Calvin Coolidge, Presi-
dent of the United States of America, . . . do hereby declare and
grant amnesty and pardon to all persons who have heretofore or
may hereafter be convicted of desertion . . . committed . . . on
or since November 11, 1918; to the extent that there shall be . . .
fully remitted as to such persons any relinquishment or forfeiture
of their rights of citizenship." 203
This proclamation, affecting only those who deserted after November
11, 1918, was motivated by the fact that the United States was techni-
cally at war with the Central Powers until July 2, 1921, so that deser-
tion committed when all the world but the United States was at peace
resulted in the application of a wartime penalty. It should be noted
200. 13 STAT. 490 (1865).
201. See the author's Loss OF AmERICAx NATIONALITY 66 (unpublished thesis,
Cornell University, 1949).
202. 37 STAT. 356 (1912). (Repealed by 54 STAT. 1172 et seq. (1940), 8 U.S.C.
§504 (1946).)
203. 43 STAT. 1940 (1924). (Emphasis added.)
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that President Coolidge, like the framers of the 1865 law,"' considered
the penalty as involving not loss of citizenship, but loss of civil rights.
This is indicated by his use of the term "fellow citizens" in the Procla-
mation.
Apparently, this was not the State Department's point of view.
The proposed Nationality Act contained a provision that loss of Ameri-
can citizenship would result from wartime desertion. °5 Justifying this
section at the Hearings on the Nationality Act, Flournoy of the State
Department stated that this had always been the Department's con-
struction of the Act of 1865.208
In other words, the Department of State held that citizenship and
rights of citizenship, in this context, were indistinguishable. However,
the Board of Immigration Appeals differed from this interpretation.
Ruling on a question irrelevant here, the Board stated:
"This conclusion . . . assumes that a person may have the
status of citizenship without possessing, . . the 'rights of a
citizen'. Under the Federal Constitution this result, we believe,
is entirely possible. In many instances Congress has deprived
citizens of all or a part of the ordinary rights of citizenship. De-
serters from military service in time of war forfeit their rights of
citizenship. . . . Citizens who commit certain Federal crimes are
barred from holding public office." 207
In any event, the distinction no longer exists, since the congressmen
adopted Mr. Flournoy's view and included Section 401 (g) in the
Nationality Act of 1940. Desertion within or without the United
States effects loss of citizenship,208 although no one under eighteen
years of age can be thus expatriated.20° There are no recorded ad-
ministrative or judicial decisions under this provision. 10
But this enactment did not encompass those who departed from the
jurisdiction of the United States to avoid military service-and there
were many of them. The serious nature of the problem of draft
204. ROCHE, Loss oF AmEmICAN NATIONALIT 65 (unpublished thesis, Cornell
University, 1949).
205. 1 CODIFICATION 68.
206. Nationality Hearings 38.
207. In the Matter of P., 1 I. & N. Dc. 127, 132 (B.I.A. 1941).
208. 54 STAT. 1169-70 (1940), 8 U.S.C. §803a (1946).
209. Ibid., § 403b.
210. Krichefsky states that in the fiscal year 1945 one person thus lost his citizen-
ship. Supra note 226, at 14. There is no other available record of this case. The
only recorded case in which the State Department considered the problem of distinc-
tion between loss of citizenship and rights of citizenship was the Bergdoll case. The
department instructed that he should not be issued a passport. When he returned to
the United States in 1939 to serve his sentence, the I. & N. S. claimed the State De-
partment had held him an alien in 1920, and therefore he could not he admitted as a
citizen. The Attorney General ruled that he should be admitted as a citizen, "leaving
the matter to be determined by the courts at such proper time in the future as subse-
quent developments may warrant." 39 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 303 (1939).
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dodgers led the Attorney General on November 18, 1943, to request
Congress to enact adequate legislation.2 ' Congress, in the Act of
September 27, 1944, incorporated the Attorney General's recommenda-
tions into the Nationality Act, providing that loss of citizenship would
result from
"Departing from or remaining outside of the jurisdiction of
the United States in time of war or during a period declared by
the President to be a period of national emergency for the purpose
of evading or avoiding training and service in the land or naval
forces of the United States." 212
This section immediately created extremely difficult problems for
the administrative authorities. First of all, there was no stipulation as
to the minimum age limit. Did it apply only to those over age twenty-
one? Or could it be utilized against those under twenty-one? After
the Central Office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and
the Board of Immigration Appeals had reached diametrically opposing
points of view on this question, the Attorney General decided that Con-
gress intended that the statute should apply to those under twenty-
one.2"' Since that time a district court has held in the Inouye case 21
that the age limit under Section 401 (i)-which in this respect was
identical in form with 401 (j)-was twenty-one. In the absence of
congressional specification, that court held the traditional minimum
age of twenty-one is a prerequisite to loss of nationality. However,
Attorney General Clark was unquestionably correct in his interpreta-
tion of the will of Congress. The legislators obviously intended that
this section should be applicable to anyone eligible for the draft, that is,
any male over eighteen years of age.
Although no citizenship was lost under this provision prior to
September 27, 1944, the administrators have held that a person who
departed from the United States before that date but remained outside
afterwards with the intention of avoiding conscription lost his citizen-
ship." This was true even where the departure was for sickness, if
it could be demonstrated that the refusal to return was motivated by
draft-shyness. 6 This section has also been held applicable to all for
whom military service is an imminent possibility, 1 7 including persons
211. Cited by the Central Office In the Matter of A-y H., file #56196/251 (1945).
212. 58 STAT. 746 (1944), 8 U.S.C. §801j (1946).
213. In the Matter of A-y H., supra note 249; reversed by Att'y Gen. (1946).
214. Inouye v. Clark, 73 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Cal. 1947), rev'd on other grounds,
175 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1949).
215. In the Matter of V., file #56175/93 (B.I.A. 1945).
216. In the Matter of V.L., file #A-6347956 (B.I.A. 1947).
217. In the Matter of V.D., file #56196/783 (B.I.A. 1946).
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under eighteen years of age.218 However, in each case the administra-
tive authorities examine all the evidence very carefully to determine
whether the required "intent to avoid military service" is present, and
have even gone so far as to hold in some instances where the person
concerned confessed such intent, that the supplementary evidence did
not warrant giving this confession credence.219 Loss of citizenship may
not be based on mere violations of Selective Service regulations 220_
although such violations "may be shown by the evidence to be an
integral step in the consummation of the proscribed purpose" 221-and,
on the other hand, a belated compliance with the regulations is no bar
to establishing prior intent to evade service.222
It should be noted that Section 401 (j) penalizes remaining out-
side the jurisdiction of the United States with the intent of avoiding
service equally with departing from the United States with this in mind.
However, the administrators have taken the view that for a person thus
to lose his American nationality it must be proven that he "intended to
come to the United States but refrained from doing so because he feared
military service." 22 This view put a heavy burden of proof on the
administrative authorities, 224 but Americans have been denationalized,
when the evidence demonstrated that: 1) the citizen came to the
United States boundary, applied for admission, but withdrew his re-
quest on hearing of his military obligations; 2) the person "hovered at
the United States border ior about 14 months before seeking admis-
sion"; 3) the citizen discussed returning with the United States con-
sular officials; 4) the American demonstrated by conversation with his
friends that he was avoiding the draft; 5) the person had no good rea-
son to remain abroad; 6) the citizen's brothers had all come to the
United States, and he had no excuse for not coming himself; 7) the
American registered abroad after V-E Day with the belief that Japan
was close to defeat. 25
Departure from the United States in order to result in loss under
this section must be "voluntary". However, an ingenious American
218. In the Matter of G.G., file #A-6450222 (B.I.A. 1947).
219. In the Matter of I., file #56172/758 (B.I.A. 1944).
220. In the Matter of G., file #A-6544269 (B.I.A. 1947).
221. Sharon, Loss of Citizenship by Draft Dodgers, 5 I. & N.S. MONTHLY REV.
97, 98 (1948). The author is indebted to Mr. Sharon for his valuable assistance.
222. In the Matter of C.M., file #A-6701904 (B.I.A. 1947); In the Matter of
L.C., file #A-6313888 (B.I.A. 1947).
223. In the Matter of M., file #A-6690283 (B.I.A. 1947).
224. In the words of one administrator: "Experience . . . makes it clear that
it is no easy task to establish the proscribed motive specified in this statute. Proof of
a state of mind is elusory especially where the individual is bent on thwarting dis-
covery." Sharon, op. cit. supra note 221, at 99. See e.g., Pence v. McGrath, 91 F.
Supp. 23 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
225. Sharon, op. cit. supra note 221, at 99.
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who succeeded in having himself arrested and deported as an alien, did
not convince the Board of Immigration Appeals that his departure was
involuntary.226 But the section does not apply to acts committed within
the United States,22 7 so that an American who feigned alienage and
spent the war working in the United States as a contract laborer could
not be reached. 228  Nor does a deserter from the United States Army
who takes refuge abroad fall within the purview of this provision, as
Section 401 (g) has special reference to such Americans.229
With regard to minors, the controlling view at the moment is that
Congress intended this denationalization provision to apply to anyone
eligible for service in'the armed forces. Thus, it has been held appli-
cable to persons below twenty-one. Presumably if a foresighted lad left
the United States when he was fifteen with the intention of avoiding
the draft, his remaining outside the country after attaining the age of
eligibility would cost him his nationality. A citizen who left the United
States, or remained outside the United States, under duress-a rather
improbable eventuality 229-- would not be expatriated. The Board of
Immigration Appeals has held, however, that such departure can not be
considered coerced when the citizen claims that he is obeying a parental
order.2
0
PRESUMPTION OF Loss BY Six MONTHS RESIDENCE ABROAD
Section 402 of the Nationality Act declares in effect that any
American who has nationality under the law of some foreign state, or
any American who is the son of a person who has such dual nationality,
who resides for six months in the state which claims either him or his
parent as a national, shall be presumed to have entered the armed forces
of such state or accepted employment under such state for which only
its nationals are eligible. Furthermore, this presumption operates
whether or not the individual has returned to the United States until
overcome in accordance with established regulations. This is indeed
a peculiar enactment.
Queried as to its purpose, officials of the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service maintained silence, stating only that the expatriations
by force of its provisions had "been few and far between." 2 How-
226. In the Matter of C., file #A-6070986 (B.IA. 1947).
227. 54 STAT. 1169-70 (1940) ; 8 U.S.C. § 803a (1946).228. In the Matter of A.F., file #A-6692660 (B.I.A. 1947).229. In the Matter of C., file #56175/45 (B.I.A. 1945).
229a. But see In the Matter of C.Z., file #A-6819342 (B.I.A. 1948) for 5su.h a
case.230. In the Matter of M.B., file #A-6431026 (B.I.A. 1947).
231. 54 STAT. 1169 (1940) ; 8 U.S.C. § 802 (1946).
232. Conversation with J. P. Sharon, Examiner, I. & N.S., Washington, D.C.,
July 6, 1949.
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ever, the answer to this question can be found elsewhere; i.e., in the
pages of the Hearings on the Nationality Act of 1940.
This section was not included in the original, proposed Nationality
Act, 3 but was added in the course of the hearings at the request of
the War Department." 4 Most of the discussion was held during execu-
tive sessions of the sub-committee, but there are enough passing refer-
ences to this proviso elsewhere in the text so that its purpose can be
fairly definitely determined. First of all, the original wording applied
only to persons born in incorporated territories of the United States, or
of a parent born in such a territory. Therefore, the only people who
would have fallen within the purview of this provision as originally
drawn were Americans born in Alaska and Hawaii, or of a parent born
in Alaska or Hawaii.
Stray comments made at the Hearings show that the legislation
was aimed at certain inhabitants of Hawaii,285 particularly at some of
the Hawaiian Japanese, the "Kibei" who returned to Japan and served
in the Japanese Army. In all probability the War Department believed
that the Japanese government was training a "Fifth Column", and that
some method should be devised to bar those who had been thus trained
from returning to the United States.
The Hawaiian and Alaskan Delegates to Congress objected stren-
uously to this piece of discrimination against their bailiwicks, 28 6 and,
probably as a result of their objections, the wording of the section was
changed so that it no longer applied specifically to inhabitants of in-
corporated territories. Changing the wording of the statute did not
affect the operation of the measure, since the administrators knew what
they were to look for.
The rules promulgated by the Department of State and the Depart-
ment of Justice were very simple. Residence for the purpose of this
section commenced after January 13, 1941, and the six months could
not begin until the person concerned was eighteen years old. Any per-
son could overcome the presumption by proving that he had not served
in a foreign army or held office.287
233. Nationality Hearings 147.
234. Ibid.; see 1 CODIFICATION 69.
235. Nationality Hearings 150. For example Mr. Flournoy of the State Depart-
ment stated: "If a man is a citizen of the United States and Japan, both countries,
as he would be in all these cases we have been discussing, and he is living in Japan
if a Japanese is living in Hawaii, then under the kind of case we have been
discussing, he goes to Japan and they take him into the Army when he reaches the
military age [he always pleads duress]." Nationality Hearings at 150. (Emphasis
added.) See also id. at 168.
236. Id., at 364; 86 CONG. REc. 11962 (1940).
237. See 22 CODE FED. REG. § 19.16 (Cum. Supp. 1943).
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In summary, Section 402 appears to have been a special provision
designed to cope with an extraordinary situation. According to officials
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, it was a wartime ex-
pedient and is not now considered an active part of the Nationality
Law.238
THE COURTS AND Loss OF NATIONALITY
What legal recourse does one have from an unfavorable admin-
istrative determination? Prior to 1940, the right to obtain a judicial
determination of one's citizenship was in doubt. In the famous case
of United States v. Ju Toy 289 the Supreme Court held that Ju Toy,
whom the Secretary of Commerce and Labor had determined to be an
alien, had no right to a judicial decision on the issue. Unless some-
one in Ju Toy's position could introduce new evidence on the matter,
or prove an abuse of authority by the administrator, the administrative
decision was conclusive. However, this rule was seriously modified in
later decisions, the Court pointing out that citizenship in such an ad-
ministrative proceeding was a jurisdictional fact-unless the person
concerned were an alien, the Secretary of Commerce and Labor had no
authority over his person.240 In effect, if an alleged alien could present
a good prima facie case for citizenship, the courts, usually in habeas
corpus proceedings, would review the decisions of the administrators.
Another method of getting into court was employed in the Elg
case, where Miss Elg brought suit against the Secretary of Labor to
obtain a declaratory judgment that she was a citizen, and simultane-
ously enjoined Secretary Perkins from deporting her.2"' Ethel Mac-
kenzie used injunctive proceedings in her attempt to clarify her citizen-
ship status.242
These methods suffered from one outstanding limitation. They
could be employed solely in the United States. What recourse did an
American have who was informed by the Consul at Benin or Rangoon
that he was no longer a citizen? The records do not disclose that any
provision was made for this type of case. The only feasible alternative
for such a person was to try and slip into the United States surrepti-
tiously and, when apprehended, sue out a writ of habeas corpus. Con-
sidering the importance of American citizenship, there were remarkably
238. Conversations with J. P. Sharon, Examiner, I. & N.S., and Charles Gordon,
Senior Counsel, I. & N.S., Washington, D.C., July 6, 1949.
239. 198 U.S. 253 (1905).
240. Quon Quon Poy v. Johnson, 273 U.S. 352 (1927) ; Ng Fung Ho v. White,
259 U.S. 276 (1922) ; Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1920).
241. Perkins v. Eig, 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
242. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
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few procedural safeguards protecting the individual against loss of na-
tionality by administrative injustice.
Fortunately, this is no longer the case. Although no provision for
judicial review of administrative denationalization was included in the
proposed Nationality Act,248 or in the act as approved by the House
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization,"' the Senate insisted
on adding Section 503 to the statute, providing that any person denied
nationality by any Department or agency,
". .. regardless of whether he is within the United States
or abroad, may institute an action against the head of such De-
partment or agency in the District Court of the United States for
the District of Columbia or in the district court of the' United
States for the district in which such person claims a permanent
residence for a judgment declaring him to be a national of the
United States." 245
If the person instituting suit was abroad, the section continued, he could
obtain a provisional passport from a United States diplomatic or con-
sular officer in order to go to the United States and defend his claim.
However, anyone who is allowed to come to the United States on such
a provisional passport is subject to immediate deportation if he loses
his case.
There still remains an element of administrative discretion in this
process. The law declares that the provisional passport will be granted
to a person on whose behalf suit has been instituted, if he submits
"a sworn application showing [the United States diplomatic or
consular officer] that the claim of nationality presented in such
action is made in good faith and has a substantial basis . . . and
from any denial of an application for such certificate the applicant
shall be entitled to an appeal to the Secretary of State, who, if he
approves the denial, shall state in writing the reasons for his de-
cision." "'
Although the Secretary must put his reasons for denial in writing, these
exercises in composition are not available for the use of students of
nationality problems. Therefore it is impossible to say at this time
243. 1 CODIFICATION 80.
244. Nationality Hearings 360.
245. 54 STAT. 1171-2 (1940). In addition, § 501 prescribed a certificate of loss of
nationality to be filled out by the State Department and presented to each expatriate.
In this manner, anyone who loses his nationality receives notification, and evidence on
which to base a law suit under § 502. See Dep't State, Departmental Order No. 909,
Jan. 2, 1941. For an example of a suit by one outside the United States, see
N.Y. Times, June 1, 1949, p. 33, col. 6.
246. 54 STAT. 1171-2 (1940), 8 U.S.C. §902 (1946).
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what criteria are used in accepting and rejecting applications under this
section.
A steady trickle of lawsuits have come into the courts under Sec-
tion 503. The outcome of most of these cases has emphasized the value
of this provision in protecting the individual against arbitrary admin-
istrative determinations.24 Thus it would appear that at last pro-
cedural barriers have been established to prevent United States citizens
from being arbitrarily stripped of their nationality.
CONCLUSIONS
It is still too early to reach more than tentative judgments on the
operation of the Nationality Act of 1940, particularly since many of
its expatriation provisions did not go into full effect until the end of
the war. As a result, this analysis, like Mahomet's coffin, is suspended
half-way between heaven and earth-the heaven of future consistency
and the earth of past confusion. The following suggestions appear to
the author to follow from the discussion.
First, all administrative decisions in connection with loss of na-
tionality should be published at regular intervals. At present the de-
cisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals are available for scrutiny,
but the Department of State refuses even to discuss the criteria by
which it proceeds. One of the drawbacks of this analysis is that it is
based on incomplete data since the current
"administrative determinations of the Department [of State] on
this question are for the guidance of the personnel of the Depart-
ment and its officers in the field. They are not furnished to other
persons." 248
Loss of nationality is an area particularly vulnerable to administrative
injustice, and one cannot but feel that the State Department is the un-
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easy possessor of a closet full of skeletons. This should not be the
case. The State Department should be required to publish an annual
abstract of its administrative determinations on loss of nationality.2 49
It is true that judicial review is available in theory to any person who
believes himself unjustly denationalized. But, in practice there may be
an administrative labyrinth between the individual and the United
States courts. It should be emphasized that before a person can apply
to the State Department for a provisional passport to come to the
United States and defend his citizenship, someone has to institute suit
on his behalf. The case of Dos Reis 210 comes to mind at this point. In
order to get a judicial determination that he served in the Portuguese
Army under duress and therefore did not lose his citizenship, Dos Reis
had to stow away in an aircraft bound from the Azores to Massachu-
setts, and, when apprehended, institute habeas corpus action. Pre-
sumably, if he had not illegally stowed away, he would still be arguing
with the United States Consul at Fayal.
Second, the present tendency towards using denationalization as
a penalty should be discarded. At the moment loss of citizenship is a
supplemental penalty for desertion, treason, and leaving the United
States to avoid conscription. Presumably, the intention of the law-
makers was to deprive those convicted of the above crimes of their civil
rights. But as the law now reads, treason, desertion, and leaving the
country to avoid military service are listed as criteria for the determi-
nation of when an American has voluntarily expatriated himself, along
with voting in a foreign election, or taking an oath of allegiance to a
foreign state. Carried one step further, this could be very dangerous
to civil rights. For example, in March, 1949, Congressman Walter
of Pennsylvania introduced a bill 251 into the House of Representatives
to amend the Nationality Act by making membership in the Communist
Party evidence of voluntary expatriation! This would introduce the
old penalty of banishment into American law disguised as "voluntary
expatriation". The legitimate end of an expatriation statute is to
eliminate international problems of nationality by establishing stand-
ards by which it can be determined when an American has transferred
his allegience to another sovereign. Ideally speaking, an American
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should not be deprived of his citizenship until he has obtained that of
some foreign state. At the very least, expatriation provisions should
not be employed in the gratuitous creation of stateless persons by add-
ing loss of citizenship to the other penalties for crimes against the
sovereign.
Third, Section 404 of the Nationality Act, providing that a natu-
ralized American who establishes foreign residence for longer than the
stipulated periods loses his citizenship, should be amended so that such
residence would create a rebuttable presumption of loss of nationality.
Although the present provision may not be unconstitutional, it cer-
tainly is unwise. Assuming for the purpose of argument that a Su-
preme Court which allowed native born Americans to be classified on
the basis of their ancestry 22 will allow Congress to establish, for use
in the conduct of foreign affairs, a classification among citizens based
on birth as distinguished from naturalization, there is no reason why
this classification should be employed in effecting loss of citizenship.
The State Department's fondness for clean cut rules may well be sub-
ordinated to the desire to prevent injustice being done to adopted
Americans. In effect, the above suggestion entails a return to the 1907
procedures in this matter.
In conclusion, the Nationality Act of 1940 was an attempt to bring
order out of chaos. Although some anomalies still remain, the methods
by which American citizens lose their nationality have been codified and
regularized as never before in our history. It is easy to criticize the
administrative authorities for their early zig-zags, but acquaintance
with the subject matter and its complexity forces one to respect their
courage in tackling these knotty problems. However, today, while the
problems are not as unexplored as before, there are more of them, and
the administrative authorities in the Departments of State and Justice
are making a tremendous number of decisions with a vital effect on the
lives of human beings scattered throughout the world. It thus becomes
even more imperative that all these decisions be available for public
scrutiny-preferably in published form like those of the Board of Im-
migration Appeals-for administrative injustice burgeons in darkness.
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